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Introduction 
 
 When one considers the abundant number of nations, laws, and forms of government that have 
emerged throughout the history of civilization, it becomes apparent that although mankind shares common 
traits and attributes, societies often implement different principles as they strive to protect their interests and 
achieve their goals.  As the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau remarked, “besides the principles that are 
common to all, every nation has in itself something that gives them a particular application, and makes its 
legislation peculiarly its own.”1   
  
 Because every society faces a unique set of challenges, every society must solve its particular 
dilemmas in a unique fashion.  In his celebrated work, The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu observed that “the 
government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humor and disposition of the 
people in whose favor it is established.”2  This treatise seeks to illustrate that the law of a society must be 
founded upon principles that not only promote its welfare and goals, but also are compatible with its culture.  
If a society is to be successful, its government must also be capable of recognizing threats to stability and 
managing them in a fashion that preserves its ideals and foundational principles.   
 
 This treatise is divided into three parts.  Part I consists of an abstract philosophical discussion on the 
nature of government and role of law within society.  In Part II, the role of law within the American system 
of government is portrayed.  Part III begins with a consideration of the role fulfilled by the Supreme Court 
within the American legal system and concludes with a discussion concerning the potential usefulness of the 
Court in preserving the fundamental principles of American society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract and  Discourses, p. 226  
2 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, p. 6. 
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PART I:  ON THE ROLE OF LAW 
 
I. The Role of Law in Civil Society 
 
On the purpose of laws in general 
 
 Many philosophers have attempted to explain the origin of law, and of civil society.  The purpose of 
this treatise is not to examine these perpetual questions, but rather to accept the fact that laws exist and 
examine the role of law within civilized society, beginning with the purpose of law, and then proceeding to 
how that purpose may best be achieved by humanity. 
 
 The purpose of law is to produce one of two things:  either [1] an idealistic society or [2] a practical 
society more tolerable than what has been labeled by some philosophers as the state of nature, in which there 
are no formal ties between mankind, and no civil or statutory law.   
 
On the goals of idealistic and practical societies 
 
 The goal of an idealistic society is perfection; the goal of a practical society is stability and order.   
 
 The laws of an idealistic society are designed to promote faith in idealistic beliefs and improve the 
character of individuals and this, in turn, is thought to benefit society.  The laws of a practical society are 
designed to resolve conflict and promote the concept of justice, and are generally concerned with regulating 
interactions between individuals. 
 
 The laws of an idealistic society are concerned more generally with the welfare of the soul, its 
development and preservation.  The laws of a practical society are more generally concerned with the welfare 
of the body.  The laws of a practical society promote cooperation and discourage strife among its citizens in 
an effort to promote the temporal needs of the body and a safe environment in which to enjoy them. 
 
 The two societies may also be understood in terms of negative and positive liberty.  As outlined by 
Isaiah Berlin, negative liberty “is involved in the answer to the question ‘What is the area within which the 
subject-- a person or group of persons -- is or should be left to do or be what he wants to do or be, without 
interference by other persons?’”3  In contrast, positive liberty “is involved in the answer to the question 
                                                
3 Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, pp. 6-7 
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‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference, that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing 
rather than another?’”4  A practical society is mostly concerned with setting the parameters regulating negative 
liberty, and the laws of such a society specify the limits of government and the limits of individuals so that 
individual liberties are not encroached upon in an improper manner.  Conversely, an ideal society often 
establishes a source of divine guidance, whether it be a deity, a prominent figure or group of figures, that 
produces laws instructing the individual members of society on how to best govern themselves in harmony 
with others.  While disobedience to the law is enforced with negative consequences, oftentimes the penalties 
are enforced upon the individuals by themselves through guilt and penitence, or as they are subjected to 
emotional distress stemming from the shame of failing the society or the fear of eternal punishments in the 
next life.   
 
On the enforcement of laws in each society 
 
 Laws are enforced in a practical society by means of punishment and reward, reinforced with appeals 
to justice.  In an ideal society, laws are similarly enforced through actual punishment and reward based on a 
concept of justice.  Additionally, as observed previously, the laws of an ideal society are further reinforced by 
idealistic beliefs, and in some cases, abstract punishment and reward (i.e. punishments and rewards that are 
not immediate, but are believed to take place at some later time in the future or in the next life). 
 
On the effectiveness of law and the dissolution of governments 
 
 The law of an idealistic society proves effective until the majority loses faith in the ideal.  The law of 
a practical society proves effective until fear of punishment or aspiration for reward is lost by the majority of 
the people.   
 
 These two forms of society may be established under any form or structure of government; 
democracies, monarchies, aristocracies, and even tyrannies rely on some form of law, whether it be idealistic 
or not, to maintain order.  While some forms of government are certainly more compatible with the goals of 
either an idealistic or a practical society, what is more significant and relevant is that in every case, the 
legitimacy of law relies upon the tacit consent of the majority; for if the majority loses confidence in the laws, 
the legitimacy of the society is undermined and the society is often overturned by revolution and new laws are 
                                                
4 Idem 
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instated.  Thus, those who control the creation and enforcement of law must pattern their actions after the 
will of the majority.5   
 
 What is to be concluded then, is not that each form of government is equally accountable to the 
majority, but rather that each form of government is accountable in some degree to the will of the majority.  
If the majority dislikes government, a revolution will eventually take place, whether it be political or more 
likely, by force.  When this occurs, the government is dissolved and the society is annihilated.6   
 
 Society may also be dissolved due to the conquest of foreign powers, but as such matters are 
generally resolved through military strength rather than diplomacy, a failure to defend against invasion may 
only be attributed to law indirectly.  And as the object of the present inquiry is to determine how a society 
may utilize law to guard against self-destruction, we will neglect matters of war for the moment; for one must 
first produce a stable society if one wishes to have any hope of defeating foreign powers. 
 
II. The Object of Government in Civil Society 
 
On the first aim of government and how this is to be obtained 
 
 The first aim or goal of government must therefore be to win the consent of the majority, whether 
by force or persuasion; otherwise, there can be no legitimate sovereignty.   
 
 While force may in some cases produce immediate results, force also breeds resentment and 
malcontent on the part of the conquered, and sows seeds of revolution in the population from the very 
beginning.  Thus, governments founded upon force are often unstable and violent in nature, for force must 
be exercised continually to suppress rebellion.   
 
                                                
5 Admittedly, the extent to which they do so depends largely upon their level of accountability to their fellow members 
of society.  For example, a democratic government by nature is more likely to discern and acquiesce to the will of the 
individual members of society, whereas in a monarchy, the sovereign power determines a mode of laws that is at the very 
least acceptable, if not favorable to the majority.  However, even a tyrant with absolute power is wary of his mortality 
and is wary of placing his will above that of his subjects, although it is admitted that the deference given to society by a 
despot is significantly less than in other forms of government. 
6 It may be objected that a military dictator could rebuff a majority of unarmed citizens in an effort to preserve society, 
but with each citizen that is destroyed, the power of society diminishes and therefore such a course of action does not 
preserve society, but merely prolongs its destruction.  Another objection that may be raised is that if a dictator controls 
the military and the citizens are kept unarmed, he may successfully maintain a regime by systematically destroying 
opposition and in this manner eliminate the threat of revolution.  But this is not a method of countering a revolution in 
progress, but rather a method of incorporating fear and force into society as a manner of managing the majority. 
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 In contrast, persuasion requires more time and deliberation; however, a government composed of 
individuals convinced of their citizenship and committed to the cause of perpetuating the society is far less 
likely to rebel against authority.  Such a government need not be democratic in nature, for it is certainly 
possible to foster enthusiasm for an individual or a trusted group of individuals, particularly in an idealistic 
society, and men may peacefully submit to an aristocratic government or monarchy if they feel secure and 
satisfied with their leaders. 
 
On equality and social justice 
 
 Perhaps the greatest method of producing tacit consent and winning over the majority is by 
cultivating the concepts of equality and social justice within a society.  In order for equality to be regarded as 
legitimate, each individual must feel free to act in the same capacity as every other member of society.  At the 
same time, social justice can only be maintained if every individual in society is inclined to exercise their 
freedom in a similar, responsible manner within the boundaries of law.  Unfortunately, as human nature in 
inclined towards avarice and ambition, equality often leads to the abuse of freedom and a loss of social 
justice.  Conversely, any effort to produce social justice by influencing or controlling the actions of individuals 
necessarily encroaches upon the principle of equality. 
 
 This apparent paradox has led many to conclude that equality and social justice are incompatible.  
However, the opposite is true; that is, neither can exist without the other.  For if there is no sense of social 
justice in enforcing the law, there can be no equality under the law, for some members of society will escape 
punishment while others go free.  Conversely, there is no need for social justice if there is no sense of rights 
equally enjoyed by all to protect.  Thus, equality and social justice exist in a symbiotic state of equilibrium, and 
if a society wishes to employ one, it must necessarily attend to the other at the same time. 
 
 Though the goals of equality and social justice are intertwined, the methods of producing them are 
fundamentally different.  The degree of social justice is most directly influenced by the actions of the citizens 
in a society, while the degree of equality is most directly influenced by the policy of government.  In other 
words, when a government institutes a law, it cannot ensure that the law will be universally observed, but can 
merely enforce the punishments if the law is disobeyed, which contributes to social justice only in an indirect 
manner.  On the other hand, government may always introduce policy that directly affects equality in society, 
for it is the government that determines how rights are to be distributed among its citizens. 
 
 Thus, the most efficient way for government to produce both equality and social justice, is by 
constructing a policy that promotes the former.  The equality being promoted may be actual or simply 
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illusory; what is important is that the majority feels that equality exists.  The probability of this occurring 
obviously increases as the citizens are granted more political and civil rights, but absolute equality is not 
always necessary to win over the majority.   
 
On the degree of equality necessary to produce stable government 
 
 In some cases, very minimal levels of equality are sufficient, as in the example previously mentioned 
where there is particular zeal for the individuals who govern society.  When this occurs, the majority tends to 
accept that more rights be given to those in leadership positions; thus, as love and trust increase, actual 
equality may decrease proportionally without offending the majority. 
 
On accountability 
 
 Another tool in producing an attitude of equality amongst a society is that of accountability.  If every 
member of society believes that they are equally accountable to the laws, they are unlikely to disregard their 
faith, fear, or aspirations, and will remain faithful to the government.  In this case, the equality need not be of 
freedom, for equality of servitude is just as effective in producing a sense of justice founded upon 
accountability.  That is, a society may be equally accountable to tyrannical laws and remain content in their 
position, but if occasion arises that there be any group of citizens who are privileged or exempt from the law, 
society voices outrage; the government must then restore the legitimacy of accountability or risk revolution.  
 
 This is the first of two great mistakes that diminish the spirit of equality in society:  allowing a 
minority figure or faction (generally outside of government) to exercise power over the majority.  The latter 
mistake is the negation of the former, and is most relevant in enlightened and idealistic societies; that is, 
allowing the majority to exercise what is perceived as unjust dominion over the minority.  Thus, in addition to 
discerning the will of majority, a sovereign power must also maintain equilibrium between majority and 
minority rights.   
 
III. On Stability of Government 
 
On maintaining equilibrium between majority and minority rights 
 
 Upon examination, the first scenario is quite preventable; the second is inherently problematic.  In 
the first instance, it is easy for government to enact laws that protect the majority from minorities, since law is 
generally understood as a means of promoting the public welfare.  Laws that benefit the majority of society 
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do not merely have the support of the force of the population, but conform to most concepts of justice as 
well, and are rarely controversial.  The only way for a government to err in the first respect, then, is to favor a 
certain group of citizens based upon some arbitrary distinction rather than merit,7 and this is easily avoided. 
 
 While it is relatively easy to protect the civil rights of the majority, it becomes more difficult to 
protect the rights of minority groups and prevent discrimination in a society, particularly under a government 
founded upon democratic principles.   
 
 In the cases of tyrannies, monarchies, and aristocracies, policy is already determined by a minority 
authority figure; therefore it is not unusual, and rather, expected by the citizens that laws benefiting minorities 
will be introduced in some instances.  Therefore, under these forms of governments, the sovereign power 
may effectively regulate the relationship between majority and minority factions in most cases. 
 
 However, in a democratic government, this regulation becomes more difficult; for in a society where 
the law is always based upon the will of the majority, it necessarily follows that the will of the minority is 
neglected, which in turn can result in inequality and suppression of minority rights.  A dilemma is therefore 
produced, namely, how inalienable and idealistic rights of the minority can be protected when the law is 
determined by majority rule.  Thus, in enlightened societies, the government must not only consider the will 
of the majority, but the balance of liberty and equality.   
 
 This problem is naturally compounded as a society expands and the concept of diversity8 is given 
credibility.  Thus, in general, small societies are more easily managed than vast empires, for in most cases, 
societies with lower populations will contain fewer factions than societies with large populations.  
Additionally, if the case should arise where a small population contains many factions, it is easier to discern a 
common ground among individuals living within similar geographical parameters than it is to foster 
commonality among factions dispersed throughout large geographical expanses.   That is, small societies 
necessarily share common interests with respect to economy, resources, and defense; thus, it becomes 
difficult for a faction to sever all ties to fellow citizens and function independently, particularly if the society is 
surrounded by other formidable civilizations.  In contrast, large societies often produce degrees of economic 
                                                
7 Such a scenario is hard to envision, for when arbitrary favoritism exists, it tends to favor the majority rather than the 
minority.  An exception could be conceivably constructed in matters of conquest, when a more technologically advanced 
minority conquers a majority that is weaker in military aspects, but even in this case deference must be immediately given 
to the majority if the minority wishes to retain their acquired territory. 
8 Throughout the remainder of Part I, the term “diversity” is meant to be understood as diversity of opinions and 
interests, not diversity of race or any other physical attributes and traits. 
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and military security sufficient to allow factions to grow powerful and threaten the rights of their fellow 
citizens and the fundamental principles of society.9 
 
 When competing interests are introduced into a society, the chains of culture and plagues of passion 
produce conflict between different groups, reason becomes relative to each individual or faction, and the 
natural desires of self-interest and fear of the unfamiliar result in discrimination and suppression of minority 
rights. 
 
 Thus, the foundation upon which discrimination is built is diversity of interests, and there can be no 
discrimination and no suppression if there are no competing interests within a society.  This is difficult to 
accomplish, but not impossible. 
 
On diversity and how to limit its effects 
 
 The concept of diversity stems from the fact that there are fundamental differences between every 
individual and every group or faction.  However, every individual, group, or faction is also supplied with 
fundamental similarities, the most fundamental being that all citizens will identify themselves as being part of 
mankind.  Discrimination is therefore produced by choosing to focus on differences, rather than similarities.  
Rarely is this decision based upon reason; most often, it is directed by passion and prejudice.  Thus, the real 
issue is not whether the individuals or groups are actually more different than similar, but rather whether this 
is perceived to be the case and accepted by the majority. 
 
 It is unlikely that a society will ever achieve complete unanimity; however, a government may utilize 
certain resources to minimize the perceived differences between the majority and minority factions, and 
promote the antithesis of diversity, which is often labeled as unity by idealistic societies, and patriotism by 
practical societies.   
 
 Perhaps the most obvious resource stems from the fact that all citizens are necessarily humans.  
From this axiom there arise numerous relationships between citizens that may be utilized by government to 
extend the bonds of self-interest from the individual to the entire species, and subsequently the entire society.   
 
                                                
9 In The Federalist Papers, #10, Publius proposes a “Republican remedy” to the problem of factions in large societies.  
Since his remedy will be discussed in Part II of this work, we will not address the issue at this point.  
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 Additionally, if a society can successfully foster a strong sense of universal political identity, diversity 
may be further discouraged within a society, and disregarded entirely or applied to foreign powers, as the 
government sees fit.10 
 
On universal foundations of faith 
 
 Most philosophers claim (or at least imply) that reason is univocal and non-contradictory and 
champion reason as a sort of divine oracle, a source of truth and possessing all the keys to establishing the 
perfect society.  However, it would appear that although mankind may collectively possess the ability to 
reason, this ability differs in application among the different parts of humanity.   That is, as a child’s capacity 
to reason increases and grows, the child is simultaneously influenced by the culture and ideas surrounding the 
child.  Additionally, all individuals, whether they be children or adults, accumulate diverse interests and are 
exposed to complex dilemmas throughout their lifetimes.  As a result, what one society deems perfectly 
reasonable is often regarded as manifestly erroneous by another society, and vice versa.11 
 
 Perhaps the root of the problem is not that perfect reason does not exist, but rather that a society of 
individuals is incapable of being perfectly reasonable.  One of the inherent difficulties of utilizing reason is 
that in order to reach the proper conclusion, one must begin with the proper premises.  Since no individual 
possesses a complete knowledge of the elements and laws that make up the universe, it would seem that no 
individual possesses a complete understanding of the universe.  And if the capacity of human knowledge is 
limited and finite, each individual will inevitably be exposed to questions they have no answer for and no 
relevant knowledge or experience capable of resolving the matter.  This is particularly true in cases in which 
the subject being discussed is entirely new to the individual.12  Thus, it would seem that every individual must 
at some point base their decisions upon a foundation built, if not entirely, then at least in part, upon the 
beliefs of others.13 
                                                
10 Once again, it is not our intent to examine foreign relations and foreign policy, and therefore we must neglect the 
consideration of which course of action is most beneficial to a society. 
11 Much has been said on the subject of cultural relativism, and it is not the intention of this treatise to engage in a 
discussion of the merits of accepting or rejecting the practices of certain societies.  It is also not the purpose of this 
treatise to determine if there exists a form of society that is most correct or efficient.  However, it should be noted that it 
is very difficult for an established society to adopt the reasoning and practices of other societies that may have developed 
under very different circumstances.  Thus, if stability and perpetuation of a society is one’s goal, in general, it is better to 
retain original principles and practices than to solicit guidance from other, dissimilar civilizations. 
12 One must only reflect upon the nature of their education and upbringing to realize that essentially all of their beliefs 
are founded upon the experience and teachings of reputable figures and the majority of these figures are no longer living.  
Thus, there is a peculiar attribute of humanity that motivates each generation to pass its knowledge to the next, and in 
this manner society progresses and becomes much more complex than if each individual was limited to his or her own 
knowledge and experience.  This is why there is so much disparity of beliefs across cultures. 
13 It should be noted that some philosophers, such as Descartes, have employed methods of self-doubting to negate the 
influence of culture and upbringing.  However, the process is quite difficult and it is questionable whether one can truly 
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 In other words, the limits of reason and absolute knowledge are often supplemented with articles of 
faith acquired from one’s cultural environment.  Conversely, new hypothesis and a priori assumptions are 
often fortified with arguments constructed in a reasonable manner.  As these supporting arguments become 
increasingly complex, the ultimate foundation based on pure faith is often obscured and forgotten as 
emphasis is placed upon the evolving argument. 
 
 Thus, another method of eliminating diversity that is less obvious, but no less effective, is that of 
providing a society with a universal foundation of faith.  As was established earlier, what matters is not the 
actual relationship between factions, but rather, the perceived relationship.  While different factions base their 
perceptions upon different modes of reasoning, in every case there is a fundamental foundation of faith that 
governs their decisions.  Therefore, if a government wishes to produce and maintain a universal mode of 
reasoning among society, a government must produce and maintain a universal foundation of faith by 
educating the people in matters consistent with the goals of society.  If this is accomplished, the actions of 
every individual citizen will be in accordance with the same principles, and there will not only be a lack of 
discrimination, but a consistency in action that is directed to the good of society.14 
 
 It is important to note that the faith mentioned in this instance may be faith in external sources of 
information, or perhaps in the judgments of one’s inner self, not necessarily in deity.  Such foundations need 
not be religious in nature, but are often based upon science, or philosophy, and can take many forms, just as 
the structure of government can take many forms.  The nature of the foundation of faith is only relevant in 
the sense that its goals must be consistent with the goals of society.15 
 
 It should also be noted that producing a universal foundation of faith is inherently more difficult in 
complex societies than in isolated societies, for new ideas and experiences are always being presented to 
citizens in a complex society, whereas in an isolated society the citizens reach a point where nearly everything 
is familiar to them.  Thus, as the size of society increases, the resources to combat diversity and 
                                                                                                                                                       
doubt everything one has been taught and still function in society.  Furthermore, it is hard to envision a functioning 
society in which every member routinely participated in the exercise of self-doubt.  Additionally, in order for a society to 
be purely founded upon self-doubt, every individual in the society would have to participate in the exercise and achieve 
the same result; otherwise, they would either be unable to cooperate or they would have to rely upon the experience of 
others who completed the exercise successfully. 
14 Upon reflection, one will recognize that the production of an absolute foundation of faith is tantamount to the desired 
application of the role of law in idealistic societies. 
15 A major element of many foundations of faith will be economic theory.  As this treatise focuses primarily on law and 
political institutions, an extensive discussion of the particular influences and ramifications of different economic policies 
will not be taken up.  However, it should be noted that a society’s economic policy plays a vital role in determining the 
parameters of equality and social justice within a society. 
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discrimination decrease, the result being that the law of society becomes increasingly complex.  The 
government is no longer bound by a single, distinct majority, but in differing areas of policy, there will be 
differing coalitions of citizens; the government must therefore address the wills of multiple majorities.  Each 
generation introduces new belief systems that are preserved in statutes that are binding upon their posterity.  
Eventually the people will reject the common laws of the society in favor of their individual foundations of 
belief, and there will be revolution, secession, or anarchy.   
 
On admittance to society 
 
 It has been shown previously that the potential for revolution increases as additional cultures and 
beliefs are introduced to a society, particularly if these cultures and beliefs are opposed to those already in 
place16.  Thus, efforts should be made by a society to manage revolutionary principles and limits the harmful 
effects of such principles. 
 
 An idealistic society may overcome this by producing prerequisites of admittance calculated to foster 
a spiritual equality and unity of faith among its members; by so doing, the foundation of faith is established 
the moment each individual enters the society, and must merely be maintained.  Idealistic societies also tend 
to excommunicate members from society if they act in a manner contrary to the foundation of faith, and in 
this manner they eradicate any seeds of diversity. 
 
 Conversely, a practical society generally exercises less control over admittance and prefers the 
punishment of incarceration over expulsion when laws are broken.17  Unless a foundation of faith is 
introduced in a period of revolution or founding, the government of a practical society rarely has access to 
any resource but the rule of law.  Therefore, a practical society can never overcome the challenges of 
diversity.  It may, however, delay the consequences by enacting moderate laws and exercising restraint in 
matters where there is no overwhelming majority. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 It should be noted that diversity may be beneficial to a society when properly integrated.  That is, while new members 
of a society must be persuaded to follow the existing laws of that society, allowing for a free exchange in matters not 
controlled by the government cultivates innovation and progress within a society in such matters.   
17 When offenders are imprisoned rather than removed from society, the citizens forge a connection between society and 
the criminal world, for the prisons and their occupants must necessarily be part of their reality.  When offenders are 
removed from society, the laws retain more credibility, for those who break them are no longer in the midst of those 
who keep them.   
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On how idealistic and practical societies may achieve their respective goals 
 
 Thus, the establishment of equality and justice enable both the ideal society and the practical society 
to reach their respective goals.  For in the first case, a universal foundation of faith produced and maintained 
upon these principles will most certainly result in perfection; and, in the second case, focusing on the 
relationship between equality and justice results in moderate laws, which most certainly result in stability and 
order. 
 
 In conclusion, the role of law is to sustain the existence government, and allow society to achieve its 
goals of stability and various degrees of perfection.  To avoid revolution, a government must appease the 
majority faction, and as society becomes increasingly complex, a government must consider the balance of 
equality and justice concerning majority and minority factors.  The most effective means of securing the 
support of the majority is by persuasion; in particular, fostering sentiments of equality and justice among the 
people.  In an idealist society, this is achieved by establishing a universal foundation of faith and eliminating 
diversity.  In a practical society, there can be no universal foundation of faith, and the government must take 
great care to enact laws that produce a moderating effect.  Thus, both idealistic and practical societies may 
facilitate equilibrium between equality and justice and by so doing, effectively establish the rule of law and 
reach the goals of their societies. 
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PART II:  A COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
I. The Role of Law in the United States 
 
On the nature of American society 
 
 As we have previously established, understanding the foundations of a society is an important step in 
determining policy and appropriate forms of government within a society.  The chief struggle of a society is 
to remain true to its original principles, and maintain a solid foundation of faith while balancing majority and 
minority interests. 
 
 The development of the rule of law in the United States of America provides an apt and instructive 
illustration of the difficulties inherent to this process for numerous reasons.  First, the adoption of the 
American Constitution was, as observed by Publius in the Federalist Papers, a test to determine “whether 
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or 
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”18  Thus, 
the American experiment provides an example of a government deliberately designed to achieve particular 
long-term goals and protect certain core beliefs valued by the society, rather than the arbitrary whims and 
demands of a victorious conqueror. 
 
 Additionally, the American experiment is a relatively recent and well-documented event, and the rule 
of law is therefore easier to track than in ancient societies with complex histories.  As de Tocqueville so 
eloquently stated,  
[t]he spirit of analysis has come to nations only as they aged, and when at last they thought 
of contemplating their cradle, time had already enveloped it in a cloud, ignorance and pride 
had surrounded it with fables behind which the truth lies hidden.  America is the only 
country where one has been able to witness the natural and tranquil developments of a 
society, and where it has been possible to specify the influence exerted by the point of 
departure on the future of states [...] they had already reached that degree of civilization that 
brings men to the study of themselves, they have transmitted to us a faithful picture of their 
opinions, mores, and laws [...] America therefore shows us in broad daylight what the 
ignorance or barbarism of the first ages hid from our regard.19 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Kesler, Charles R., & Rossiter, Clinton (Eds.), The Federalist Papers, p. 27. 
19 Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, p. 28. 
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On the foundation of American society 
 
 American society was founded upon natural rights philosophy, democratic and republican theory, 
and the principle of limited government.  In addition, the American legal system incorporated the concept of 
an independent judicial branch and also inherited the common-law tradition of Great Britain.  These key 
aspects of the American founding are critical to understanding the American legal system and the principles it 
attempts to uphold.   
 
 What is particularly interesting about American society is that, although it might initially seem that 
natural rights philosophy demands standards that may only be accomplished by an ideal society, in actuality, 
American society is a practical society.  This is because, in addition to the lofty ideals set by natural rights 
philosophy, American society is also founded upon doctrines that recognize the inherent frailties of men, 
such as the principle of limited government.  Rather than seeking to eliminate such frailties, the founders 
accepted them as part of human nature and sought instead to limit their effects.  Thus, a complex society 
emerged in which idealistic principles direct the policy of society, but perfection is not expected as an end 
result. 
 
II. Natural Rights Philosophy 
 
On the key principles of natural rights philosophy 
 
 As stated in the Declaration of Independence, American colonists held these important truths to be 
self-evident: that “all Men are created equal,” that “they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights,” and that “among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”20  Additionally, the colonists 
understood that “to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers 
from the Consent of the Governed.”21  The colonists also believed that “whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”22 
 
 From this succinct summary, we may draw three basic themes of natural rights philosophy.   First, 
every individual has an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Second, the purpose of 
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government is to protect these rights.  Finally, the legitimacy of government is based on the consent of the 
governed, and therefore the people have the right to withdraw their support and establish a new form of 
government if the existing government fails to provide for their needs. 
 
 In order to understand the aforementioned principles, it is necessary to consider the first origins of 
society and, in particular, the concept of a state of nature and the social compact theory.  
 
On inalienable rights 
 
 The majority of natural rights philosophers held that before societies formed and governments were 
introduced, humanity existed in a state of nature, in which every individual essentially provided for his or her 
needs and his or her protection.  As depicted by the philosopher John Locke, the state of nature was 
a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and 
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or 
depending on the will of any other man. 
 
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same 
species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of 
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or 
subjection.23 
 
 This is not to say that each individual was equal in terms of physical strength or cunning, but rather, 
in the state of nature, there existed no reserves of wealth or posts of hereditary power to be filled.  Each 
individual was offered the “same advantages of nature” and given no artificial means to augment survival.  
Additionally, no artificial modes of oppression, no government, and no formal, written laws or constitutions 
existed in the state of nature.  Thus every individual retained a personal sovereignty over his or her life, labor, 
and physical well-being. 
 
On the purpose of government and law 
 
 Ideally, in such as state, individuals maintain order by following the law of nature, or the law of 
reason.  Locke continues,  
though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence [sic]; though man in that state 
have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty 
to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use 
than its bare preservation calls for it.  The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but 
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consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty or possessions [...] Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to 
quit his station wilfully [sic], so, by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, 
unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.24  
 
 But while “the execution of the law of nature is in that state put into every man’s hand, whereby 
everybody has the right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation,”25 
problems eventually emerge.  Though all exist in a state of political equality, and there exist no artificial means 
of oppression, there must necessarily be some individuals who are naturally stronger or more cunning and are 
able to take advantage of weaker individuals unable to produce any means of punishing their oppressors.  As 
the philosopher Thomas Hobbes noted, 
the laws of nature [...] of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be 
observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and 
the like.  And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a 
man at all.  Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, 
when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, 
or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own 
strength and art, for caution against all other men.26 
 
 This troubling aspect of human nature leads to three key defects of the state of nature, as outlined by 
John Locke: 
[1] There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common 
consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all 
controversies between them.  For though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational creatures; yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of 
study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their 
particular cases [...] 
 
[2] [T]here wants a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences 
according to the established law.  For every one in that state, being both judge and 
executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is 
very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as 
negligence and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s [...] 
 
[3] [T]here often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it 
due execution.  They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail, where they are able, by 
force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment 
dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.27 
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 Because these defects result in a state of confusion and instability, eventually individuals unite into a 
society and form government in order to establish universal codes of conduct and provide consistent and fair 
enforcement of those standards.  As Thomas Paine observed, in the state of nature 
the strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual 
solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn 
requires the same [...] thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form [man] into 
society, [...] [and] as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice eventually man must 
recognize the necessity of establishing some form of government to supply the defect of 
moral virtue.28 
 
 In sum, natural rights philosophy recognizes that “there is a universal justice emanating from reason 
alone.”29  However, it also recognizes that in order “to be admitted among us, [the observation of justice] 
must be mutual” and that “[h]umanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are 
ineffective among men” because “they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, 
when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him” and therefore 
“[c]onventions and laws are [...] needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object.”30  Thus, the 
purpose of government is to protect individual rights by providing more stability and consistency than would 
exist in the state of nature. 
 
On government by consent of the governed 
 
 It is also important to recognize that, according to natural rights philosophy, individuals willingly 
enter into a social contract to protect their collective interests.  In other words, government cannot be forced 
upon individuals because of their inalienable rights to govern themselves in the state of nature.  As Locke 
explains, 
[m]en being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put 
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.  
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds 
of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their 
comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their 
properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it.  This any number of men may 
do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of 
the state of nature.  When any number of men have so consented to make one community 
or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein 
the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.31 
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 Thus, initially the law of a society gains its legitimacy from the consent of those who entered into the 
social contract.  Afterwards, the law retains its legitimacy by remaining faithful to the will of the majority.  
The will of the majority may be expressed explicitly in various manners, according to the design of the 
society’s constitution.  Additionally, on a more fundamental level, Locke observed that “every man that hath 
any possessions, or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit 
consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as any 
one under it.”32  Thus, consent may be manifested both expressly and tacitly, and, in the absence of consent, 
the laws lose their legitimacy and society dissolves. 
 
III. Democratic & Republican Theory 
 
On the merits of democratic rule 
 
 The effectiveness and utility of democratic government, or government based upon the collective 
will of the people, has long been debated by philosophers, and democracy has often been portrayed 
unfavorably.  For example, in Plato’s Republic, Socrates describes democracy as a regime in which the 
citizens “[do not] care at all from what kinds of practices a man goes to political action, but honors him if 
only he says he’s well disposed towards the multitude” and this results in “a sweet regime, without rulers and 
many-colored, dispensing a certain equality to equals and unequals alike”33  In other words, democracy was 
depicted by Plato as a misguided attempt at equality that resulted in bad laws that sought to satiate the desire 
of the unwise majority.  Democracy also ultimately ended in chaos and disorder for Plato, because the citizens 
in a democracy “end up [...] paying no attention to the laws, written or unwritten, in order that they may avoid 
having any master at all”34 and thus the regime is destined to decay into anarchy.   
 
 While Plato’s criticism of democracy is certainly reasonable and well-founded, it is important to note 
that Plato’s understanding of the origins of democracy was fundamentally different that that of the natural 
rights philosophers.  Plato envisioned a cycle of regimes, beginning with a monarchal or aristocratic 
government ruled by philosopher-kings that slowly decayed into a timarchic government, then an oligarchy, 
then a democracy, then anarchy, and finally ending in a tyranny, the lowest and most contemptible of all the 
regimes.   Thus, for Plato, democracy came into being when the lower classes in an oligarchy rise up in 
rebellion and “the poor win, killing some of the others and casting out some, and share the regime and the 
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ruling offices with those who are left on an equal basis; and, for the most part, the offices in it are given by 
lot.”35 
 
 In contrast, as we have seen above, natural rights philosophers envisioned a state of nature in which 
each individual held equal rights simply from being born as a human being.  For them, the source of equality 
was not rebellion from oppressive laws, but inalienable rights.  Thus, when a group of equal individuals enters 
into the social contract and forms a society, rule by majority is the only legitimate source of authority, for 
there is no king or ruling class to guide the new society.  Additionally, natural rights philosophers, such as 
Thomas Paine, held that “It is always in the interest of a far greater number of people in a Nation to have 
things right than to let them remain wrong” and therefore “when public matters are open to debate, and the 
public judgment free, it will not decide wrong, unless it decides to hastily.”36  In other words, majority rule is 
also supported by reason, for in such a society the law applies equally to each individual, and therefore the 
burden of unjust or unwise laws is shared by the entire community, prompting a swift change of policy. 
 
 Additionally, natural rights philosophers envisioned a more organized democracy than the loosely 
structured and unpredictable democracy of Plato.  Once individuals left the state of nature to enter into the 
social contract, they were expected to be obedient to laws established by the will of the majority (assuming 
that the government protected their inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness).  As 
Rousseau explained, 
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the 
undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general 
will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.  This means nothing less than that he 
will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his 
country, secures him against all personal dependence.  In this lies the key to the working of 
the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be 
absurd, tyrannical and liable to the most frightful abuses.37 
 
  
 Thus, for the natural rights philosophers, democratic rule was the only legitimate form of 
government because it was the one form capable of recognizing and maintaining the natural equality of 
mankind.  Democratic government was also seen by natural rights philosophers as the only sure means to 
protecting individual liberties; for while a tyrannical king or an ambitious aristocracy might trample upon the 
rights of the less powerful, it was understood that the majority of people, if they were given equal rights, 
would protect those rights from the encroachment of scheming minorities.  A government organized in this 
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manner would allow individuals to leave the state of nature and confidently depend upon his or her 
government to protect the inalienable rights of its citizens. 
 
On the inherent weaknesses of democratic rule 
 
 Despite these merits of democratic rule, there remained inherent weaknesses in democratic theory.  
In addition to the problem of instability illustrated by Plato, upon reflection it becomes apparent that if the 
law is based solely upon majority rule, there is no incentive for those in power to protect the rights and 
interests of minorities within society.  As de Tocqueville observed, “What therefore is a majority taken 
collectively, if not an individual who has opinions and most often interests contrary to another individual that 
one names the minority?”38 
 
 Put differently, in every case in which a majority passes a law, a minority of citizens suffer an 
unfavorable outcome.  While in most cases the inconvenience is minor and manageable, in a pure democracy 
there is no guarantee that a malicious majority will not take away crucial rights from a discriminated minority.  
Furthermore, when rights are usurped from a minority in a pure democracy, the only redress the unfortunate 
citizens have is an appeal to the very majority that initially wronged them.  As Publius elaborated, 
a pure democracy [...] can admit of no cure for the mischiefs [sic] of faction.  A common 
passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a 
communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is 
nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.  
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and 
have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.  
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously 
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would 
at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, 
and their passions.39 
 
 Finally, there is no guarantee that the citizenry will in fact pursue what is best for the nation in the 
long term.  Since men are naturally inclined to satisfy their own present needs and ignore the needs of future 
generations, in a pure democracy there is great incentive for the ruling majority to sacrifice the well-being of 
future generations for the pleasures of moment and a comfortable present.  Often democratic government 
produces legislative instability because “it is of the nature of democracies to bring new men to power” and 
therefore “laws have the least duration” for “[t]he majority being the sole power that is important to please, 
the works that it undertakes are eagerly agreed to; but from the moment that its attention goes elsewhere, all 
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efforts cease.”40  Thus, democracies often lack the will power to pursue long-term policy and achieve long-
term goals. 
 
On representational government and republican theory 
 
 Since it was essential for natural rights philosophy to preserve the merits of democratic rule, 
representational, or republican, government was presented as a means to remedy the weaknesses of pure 
democracy.   While a government in which each individual citizen participated might be unstable and 
logistically limited to small areas, a representational government in which the individual citizens elected 
representatives to protect their interests showed more promise.  As presented by Publius,  
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are:  first, the 
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; 
secondly, the greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which the latter 
may be extended.41 
 
 Ideally, a scheme of representation would “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations.”42  Such representatives would be removed from the immediate passions of the people and 
able to act rationally for the good of the nation while still being held accountable to the individual interests of 
the people through frequent elections.   
 
 Traditionally, earlier philosophers who had discussed representative democracies, such as 
Montesquieu, had held that although a republic based upon representation could be larger than a pure 
democracy, such a government would not be an effective way to manage a large nation.  This was because, as 
outlined by Montesquieu, 
In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less 
moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has 
interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by 
oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his 
country. 
 
[Additionally] [i]n an extended republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private 
views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents.  In a small one, the interest 
of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every 
citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected.43 
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 However, when defending the American Constitution, Publius rejected the necessity of small 
republics, and argued that in actuality, a large republic was the only effective means to provide a 
representational democracy with long-term stability.  While he admitted that a great weakness of 
representational government was that “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, 
may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of 
the people,” he maintained that this would be less likely to occur in a large republic because “the proportion 
of fit characters be not less in the large than the small republic, [and] the former will present a greater option, 
and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.”44  Additionally, he held that “as each representative 
will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult 
for unworthy candidates to practise [sic] with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often 
carried.”45 
 
 With respect to the argument that in a large republic it is hard to determine the public interest, he 
responded that there would be “greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of 
any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest.”46  This was because,  
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests, the 
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the small the number of 
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, 
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.  Extend the sphere 
and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their 
own strength and to act in unison one with each other.47 
 
 Thus, according to republican theory, by providing for representation and elections, a democratically 
themed government may be implemented in order to provide more stability to legislation and a greater sphere 
of influence while maintaining the ideals of equality and natural rights.  A large republic provides additional 
stability by setting contentious factions against each other and ensuring that no faction gains supremacy over 
the others. 
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IV. Limited Government 
 
On the purpose of limited government 
 
 The principle of limited government is closely related to the principle of government by consent of 
the governed.  In general, a limited government is a government whose power is “limited to the public good 
of society.”48  More specifically, the principle of limited government states that “the ruling power ought to 
govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions.”49  
This is because, 
all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to 
be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; 
that both the people may known their duty and be safe and secure within the limits of the 
law; and the rulers too kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they 
have in their hands to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures as they would not 
have known, and own not willingly.50 
 
 Additionally, power given to government must remain in the hands in which it was placed by the 
people.  Thus, in a representative democracy in which an elected legislature is given the responsibility of 
producing laws, 
[t]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but 
a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.  The 
people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the 
legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be.  And when the people have said, We 
will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, nobody 
else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws 
but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen authorized to make laws for 
them.51 
 
On how the American Constitution provides for limited government 
 
 The first and foremost means of limiting the government in America is the language of the 
Constitution itself.  For example, Article I, Section 1 states that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States” illustrating that the purpose of the Constitution is to set up the 
structure of government, to enumerate the powers granted to the government, and to designate which parts 
of government hold which powers.  While the proper grants and limits of power and the right to exercise 
those powers has been in constant flux since the founding, it is clear that the Constitution provided for a 
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government that incorporated the principle of separation of powers, the principle of checks and balances, 
and the principle of federalism to limit the power of government. 
 
 
On the principle of separation of powers 
 
 The principle of separation of powers is based upon the understanding that the end of government 
may be divided into separate and distinct powers.  According to Montesquieu, “[i]n every sort of government 
there are three sorts of power:  the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of 
nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.”52  He continues, 
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and 
amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted.  By the second, he makes peace 
or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against 
invasions.  By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between 
individuals.  The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive 
power of the state.53 
 
 Since each of these powers is able to be understood and carried out distinctly and separately from the 
others powers, it is possible to distribute the different powers to different branches of government.  And 
indeed, the principle of separation of powers states that such a division is desirable, for, as Montesquieu 
noted,  
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator.  Were it joined to 
the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.54 
 
 The Constitution of the United States clearly attempts to separate the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers between three branches of government.  Indeed, the very structure of the document 
manifests this principle, with Article I devoted to the legislative branch of government, Article II outlining 
the powers of the executive branch, and Article III devoted to the judicial branch.  Publius himself references 
Montesquieu and declares that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
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pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”55  It is clear, then, that this principle was of paramount 
importance in the drafting of the American Constitution. 
 
 
On the principle of checks and balances 
 
 Interestingly, one of the objections raised by the Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution was 
that the Constitution did not separate the powers of government to the proper degree.  Taking the Senate 
established by the federal constitution as the most blatant and definitive manifestation of the violation of this 
principle, the Anti-Federalist writer Brutus observed, 
[It] will possess a strange mixture of legislative, executive and judicial powers [...] 
 
[1] They are one branch of the legislature, and in this respect will possess equal powers in all 
cases with the house of representatives [...] 
 
[2] They are a branch of the executive in the appointment of ambassadors and public 
ministers, and in the appointment of all other officers, not otherwise provided for [...] 
 
[3] They are part of the judicial, for they form the court of impeachments. 
 
It has been a long established maxim, that the legislative, executive and judicial departments 
in government should be kept distinct [...] I admit that this distinction cannot be perfectly 
preserved [...] But still the maxim is a good one, and a separation of these powers should be 
sought as far as is practicable.  I can scarcely imagine that any of the advocates of the system 
will pretend, that it was necessary to accumulate all these powers in the senate.56 
 
 In contrast, Publius argued that not only was it impossible to completely separate the different 
powers, was impractical to do so as well.  He responded, 
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary 
partition of power among the several departments as laid down in the Constitution?  The 
only answer that can be given is that as all these exterior provisions are found to be 
inadequate the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the 
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
of keeping each other in their proper places.57 
 
This was to be accomplished by “giving to those who administer each department the necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others” for “[a]mbition must be 
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made to counteract ambition” and although “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government [...] experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”58 
 
 Thus, in the American system of government, in addition to Constitutional provisions delegating 
different powers to different branches, there exist additional internal checks which ensure that the balance of 
power between the branches remains stable.  
 
On the principle of federalism 
 
 The American Constitution also sought to limit government by providing for a federal system of 
government, or a system in which a national government coexists with state and local governments and each 
retains sovereignty within their respective spheres.  As illustrated by Publius,  
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided 
between two distinct government, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security arises to the rights of the 
people.  The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will 
be controlled by itself.59 
 
 Hence, by producing a federal system, the Constitution once again divides power and utilizes the 
ambition of the national government to counteract the ambition of state governments and vice versa in an 
effort to prevent either sphere of government from becoming too powerful and encroaching on the rights of 
the people. 
 
V. The Independent Judiciary 
 
On the merits of an independent judiciary 
 
 In addition to placing the judicial power in a separate and distinct branch, the framers of the 
American system sought to ensure that the justices themselves would be free from external influences.  In 
particular, Article III § 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their office during good Behaviour [...] and shall [...] receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”  Thus, in the American 
system, once justices have been appointed and confirmed, they may not be removed from office or have their 
pay diminished if their decisions are held to be unpopular by the people or the other branches of 
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government, and in this manner they are enabled to make impartial judgments.  As observed by Publius 
regarding the judiciary, 
as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence as permanency in 
office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its 
constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public 
security. 
 
[T]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution [...] which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority [....] 
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium 
of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor 
of the Constitution void.60 
 
 Publius also assured that if granted independence, the judiciary itself would not endanger the rights 
of the people because 
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in the capacity to annoy or injure 
them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community.  
The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties 
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.  The judiciary, on the contrary, has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the 
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to 
have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the 
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.61 
 
On the dangers of an independent judiciary 
 
 Despite such arguments, the Anti-Federalists criticized of the lack of accountability enjoyed by the 
judicial branch.  The Anti-Federalist Brutus questioned “whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a 
court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible.”62  He 
maintained that 
The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution in 
law, but also in equity. 
 
By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of 
it, without being confined to the words or letter [...] 
 
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time 
come before them.  And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or 
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and 
spirit of the constitution.  The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will 
have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can 
                                                
60 Id., p. 465 
61 Id., p. 464. 
62 Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, p. 304. 
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correct their errors, or control their adjudications.  From this court there is no appeal.  And 
I conceive the legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they 
are authorised by the constitution to decide in the last resort.  The legislature must be 
controled by the constitution, and not the constitution by them.63 
 
 Brutus was also concerned that an independent federal judiciary would result in “an entire subversion 
of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states” because “[e]very adjudication of the 
supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the general government [would] 
affect the limits of the state jurisdiction” and since it was likely that “the judicial power of the United States, 
will lean strongly in favour of the general government, and will give such an explanation to the constitution, 
as will favour an extension of its jurisdiction,” it followed that “[i]n proportion as the former enlarges the 
exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be restricted”64 and the states would gradually lose the ability to 
check the national government. 
 Lastly, Brutus argued that the judiciary would even end up controlling the legislature itself.  He 
observed that  
In determining these questions, the court must and will assume certain principles, from 
which they will reason, in forming their decisions.  These principles, what ever they may be, 
when they become fixed, by a course of decisions, will be adopted by the legislature, and 
will be the rule by which they will explain their own powers.  This appears evident from this 
consideration, that if the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the court, they are 
not authorised to do by the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it will 
not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or supreme law.  And the courts are 
vested with the supreme and uncontrollable power, to determine, in all cases that come 
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law, which, in 
their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior 
law give way to an inferior.  The legislature, therefore, will not go over the limits by which 
the courts may adjudge they are confined.65 
 
 Thus, Brutus famously concludes that “there is no power above [the judiciary] to set aside their 
judgment” for “they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven” and 
therefore the judiciary should not be counted on to exercise discretion and impartiality because “[m]en placed 
in [that] situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.”66 
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VI. The Common Law Tradition 
 
On the English constitution 
 
 Apart from the concept of an independent judiciary, the basic framework for the American legal 
system was inherited from the British model.  In addition to formal written laws passed by the legislature, the 
British model incorporated an informal system of law supplied by judicial rulings.  As summarized by 
Blackstone, 
The municipal law of England [...] may with sufficient propriety be divided into two kinds; 
the lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law; and the lex scripta, the written, or statute 
law. 
The lex non scripta, or unwritten law, includes not only general customs, or the common law 
properly so called; but also the particular customs of certain parts of the kingdom; and 
likewise those particular laws, that are by custom observed only in certain courts and 
jurisdictions [...]  
[T]he monuments and evidences of our legal customs are contained in the records of the 
several courts of justice, in books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises of 
learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of highest 
antiquity. [...]  I therefore stile these parts of our law leges non scripta, because their original 
institution and authority are not set down in writing, as acts of parliament are, but they 
receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by 
their universal reception throughout the kingdom.67 
On the role of precedent 
 
 To understand the common law system, it is crucial to recognize the role of precedent.  Blackstone 
continues, 
[A] very natural, and very material, question arises: how are these customs or maxims to be 
known, and by whom is their validity to be determined ? The answer is, by the judges in the 
several courts of justice. They are the depositary of the laws; the living oracles, who must 
decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of 
the land.  
 
Their knowlege [sic] of that law is derived from experience and study [...] and from being 
long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. [...] The judgment 
itself, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered and preserved, under 
the name of records, in publick [sic] repositories set apart for that particular purpose; and to 
them frequent recourse is had, when any critical question arises, in the determination of 
which former precedents may give light or assistance [...]  
 
                                                
67 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book II, Introduction, § 3, p. 63-64. 
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For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again 
in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with 
every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and 
determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent 
rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to 
his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private 
judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to 
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule admits of 
exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason [...] 
The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly 
absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a 
deference to former times as not to suppose they acted wholly without consideration.[...] [A] 
modern judge might wish it had been otherwise settled; yet it is not in his power to alter it.68 
 Thus, in a common law system, if a case is presented to a court, the court looks to the history of 
similar cases for guidance.  If the present case is shown to be sufficiently different than previous cases, a new 
judgment is given by the court.  However, if it is determined by the court that the matter in question has 
already been resolved by a previous case, pre-established principles are upheld and deference is given to the 
earlier precedent. 
 
On the problems of precedent 
 
 There are various arguments against a judicial system which must defer to previous judicial rulings in 
addition to constitutions and legislative acts.    One argument is that by giving so much weight to obscure 
legal doctrines and precedents, the citizenry becomes unfamiliar with the law.  As de Tocqueville noted, 
“there is nothing [...] more obscure for the vulgar and less within his reach than legislation founded on 
precedents.”69  This is because as time goes by, certain clauses of a constitution or legislative acts must be 
applied to various particular circumstances.  As the cases are compounded, the role of the clause or act 
becomes increasingly complex, and the average citizen is eventually forced to appeal to the experts of the 
legal profession if they are in need of an extrapolation of the effects of the law in question. 
 
 Another criticism is that in some cases, earlier precedents may be the result of human error and 
should be overturned.  As Hobbes maintained,  
[B]ecause there is no judge, [...] but may err in a judgment of equity, if afterward, in another 
like case, he finds it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to 
do it.  No man’s error becomes his own law, nor obliges him to persist in it.  Neither (for 
the same reason) becomes it a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it.  For though a 
wrong sentence given by authority of the sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as 
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are mutable, be a constitution of a new law in cases in which every little circumstance is the 
same, yet in laws immutable (such as are the laws of nature) they are no laws to the same or 
other judges in the like cases for ever after. [...] [A]ll the sentences of precedent judges that 
have ever been cannot all together make a law contrary to natural equity, nor any examples 
of former judges can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present judge of 
the trouble of studying what is equity (in the case he is to judge) from the principles of his 
own natural reason.70 
 
 As Blackstone made it clear, the common law system does theoretically provide for precedent 
contrary to reason to be overturned, but each overturned precedent undermines the rule of law.  That is, if 
precedent is equated with the law, the overturning of precedent must be equated with a revocation of law.  
Thus, if precedent is constantly being revoked within such a society, it must result in instability and disrespect 
for the law. 
 
 A final criticism of the common law system is that, in practice, appeals to reason are often used as a 
means to supplant custom and precedent with their personal interests or the prevailing opinions and interests 
of the day.  As Hobbes also observed, 
Ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law and justice disposeth a 
man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that 
unjust which it hath been the custom to punish, and that just, of the impunity and 
approbation whereof they can produce an example (or, as the lawyers which only use this 
false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent), like little children, that have no other 
rule of good and evil manners but the correction they receive from their parents and 
masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so, because, 
grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, 
as it serves their turn, receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting 
themselves against reason as oft as reason is against them [...] 71 
 
In this manner, the rule of law is once again undermined; and in more troubling fashion, for the root of the 
problem is not merely human error, but rather human nature itself. 
 
VII. Inherent Conflicts 
 
On the inherent conflicts of the American Foundation of Faith 
 
 Thus, the foundation of American government incorporates natural rights philosophy, democratic 
and republican theory, and the principle of limited government, and also inherited a common law tradition 
from Great Britain.  The result is a complex core of values and interests that often conflict with each other.  
For example, the law of reason championed by natural rights philosophy must compete with the ignorance of 
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society and the multiple, individual interests reinforced by ambition and human nature.  The democratic 
principle of majority rule appears at times to contradict the mandate of natural rights philosophy to respect 
and protect the inalienable rights of minorities.  Republican theory replaces the actual interests of individual 
citizens with perceived interests.  By separating the executive, legislative, and judicial powers the Constitution 
pits the branches against each other by design, and the principle of federalism ensures that the national 
government must compete with state and local governments.  The adoption of a Constitution that establishes 
the limits of government, along with the common law tradition of upholding judicial precedent, sets the 
interests and values of past generations at odds with the interests and values of the present generation. 
 
 It is remarkable that, in spite of these inherent conflicts, the American system of government has 
lasted over two hundred years and retained the basic ideals and structure of its original foundation.  This is 
not to say that the American existence has been an entirely stable or static one, but rather that, although the 
balance of both interests and power have admittedly fluctuated, the variations have remained more or less 
within the original framework.   
 
 Yet it may not be enough to merely retain all the original principles in some form or another.  It may 
be necessary to revive and revitalize them periodically in order to ensure that they are not neglected or 
abandoned.  As observed earlier, a society must always be aware of threats to its foundation, and a slow decay 
of principles may be just as damaging in the long run as a radical and swift rejection of those principles.  In 
the American system, both the government and the people are expected to actively participate in the pursuit 
and defense of the nation’s ideals, and a passive acknowledgement of fundamental principles may not be 
enough to ensure that the foundation remains solid. 
 
 Next, we will consider how the American government and the American people might best preserve 
and cultivate American ideals.  In particular, we will focus on the curiously vague parameters of the federal 
judiciary in the American system, and how the Supreme Court may best be utilized to most effectively uphold 
the rule of law and provide stability in American society. 
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PART III:  ON THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 
 
I. On the Vague Nature of the American Judiciary 
 
On the curious position of influence inherited by the judiciary in America 
 
 As we have previously observed, each society possesses a fundamental foundation of principles that 
must be maintained in order to ensure that the goals of each respective society are accomplished and that 
stability is maintained throughout the process.  We have also observed that the foundations of American 
society are quite complex, and in many cases it would appear that fundamentally accepted principles may be 
invoked by opposing parties to champion conflicting causes.  While it is true that internal checks and 
balances were intentionally fostered within the American system in an effort to avoid concentrated power, in 
such a system there is an inherent danger of gridlock within the legislature and gradual loss of political 
efficacy until apathy overcomes the citizenry and civic virtues virtually disappear.   
 
 When the citizenry of any society based upon individual rights and personal freedoms ceases to 
display an interest in participating in politics, such rights must necessarily be safeguarded by some other 
means, or they will ultimately be desecrated by despotism and lost in a vortex of centralized power.   In the 
American system, the federal judiciary is not elected by the people or chosen by the popular legislature, but 
rather appointed by the chief executive and approved by the Senate.  Justices are not held accountable to the 
general population, as their terms are for life and they may only be removed from office if they commit a 
significant criminal act.  Such a system is designed to free the court from the chains of politics and allow 
justices to produce just and impartial decisions.  The ties to the people, as well as federal and state 
governments, are severed and sacrificed in an effort to remove the passions and prejudices of malicious 
majorities and the agendas of powerful political interests.  Some have suggested that the vague parameters 
and inherent independence of the American Judiciary combined with its formidable power of judicial review 
place it in a position to fulfill this role.  We will next examine the nature of the American Judiciary and 
consider how its unique position might be utilized to uphold the fundamental principles of American society 
and sustain the most basic aim of society, that of stability.  
 
Philosophical commentary on the role of the judicial branch 
 
 At the time of the American Revolution, the notion of a separate, independent judicial branch was a 
relatively new concept and there had never been any practical application of the idea on a national level prior 
to the founding of the United States of America.  Consequently, its role and the proper means of 
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implementing the responsibilities of the judiciary had not been fully developed, and though there was much 
writing on the more established executive and legislative branches of government, there was little to be said 
about the judicial branch.  However, a few philosophers did provide limited commentary that is useful in 
understanding the origins of the judicial branch of government. 
 
 Montesquieu portrayed the judiciary as a protector of individual rights and upholder of law.  He 
observed, 
In despotic governments there are no laws; the judge himself is his own rule.  There are laws 
in monarchies; and where these are explicit, the judge conforms to them; where they are 
otherwise, he endeavors to investigate their spirit.  In republics, the very nature of the 
constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of the law; otherwise the law might be 
explained to the prejudice of every citizen, in cases where their honor, property, or life is 
concerned.72 
 
 De Tocqueville provided a more extensive and instructive outline of the primary characteristics of 
judicial power.  According to De Tocqueville, 
The first characteristic of judicial power among all peoples is to serve as an arbiter.  In order 
that action on the part of the courts take place, there must be a dispute.  In order that there 
be a judge, there must be a case.  As long as a law does not give rise to a dispute, therefore, 
the judicial power has no occasion to occupy itself with it.  The law exists, but the judicial 
power does not see it.  When a judge, in connection with a case, attacks a law relative to that 
case, he extends the circle of his prerogatives, but he does not go outside it, since it was 
necessary in some way for him to judge the law in order to come to judge the case.  When 
he pronounces on a law without starting from a case, he goes outside his sphere completely 
and enters that of the legislative power.73 
 
The second characteristic of judicial power is to pronounce on particular cases and not on 
general principles.  Should a judge, in deciding a particular question, destroy a general 
principle by the certitude people have that, each of the consequences of this same principle 
being struck down in the same manner, the principle becomes sterile, he remains in the 
natural circle of his action; but should the judge attack the general principle directly and 
destroy it without having a particular case in view, he goes outside the circle in which all 
peoples have agreed to enclose him:  he becomes something more important, more useful 
perhaps than a magistrate, but he ceases to represent judicial power.74 
 
The third characteristic of judicial power is to be able to act only when it is appealed to, or, 
following the legal expression, when it is seised [of a matter].  This characteristic is not 
encountered as generally as the other two [....] In its nature judicial power is without action; 
for it to move one must put it in motion.  One denounces a crime to it, and it punishes the 
guilty; one appeals to it to redress an injustice, and it redresses it; one submits an act to it, 
and it interprets it; but it does not go by itself to prosecute criminals, search for injustice, 
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and examine facts.  The judicial power would in a way do violence to this passive nature if it 
took the initiative by itself and established itself as censor of the laws.75 
 
 Thus, although the judiciary is designed to protect individual rights, its power is not absolute, but is 
limited to providing relief within the parameters of the conflicts brought before it.  That is, the judiciary is 
not allowed to address any matter of public policy on a whim or granted the ability to legislate new laws.  
Rather its role is to resolve matters where the law is in conflict or unclear and act as arbiter in the specific 
cases and scenarios that are brought before it. 
 
A commentary on constitutional convention debates concerning the role of the judicial branch  
 
 “The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787” reveal a disparity of time set aside for the 
consideration for the judiciary in proportion to the time set aside for the consideration of other matters.76  
Perhaps this is a reflection of the prevailing sentiment of the time that the judiciary would be the weakest of 
the three branches.  As Publius famously put it in Federalist #78, “[t]he judiciary [...] has no influence over 
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take 
no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; 
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive for the efficacy of its judgments.”77  Perhaps it was 
felt that a common understanding of the role of the judiciary was already in existence.  Or perhaps the 
judiciary was merely neglected due to a plethora of more important political topics and compromises that had 
to be considered by the participants of the convention. 
 
 Whatever the case, the brief discussions of the judiciary reveal that the majority of individuals at the 
convention considered it essential to the rule of law that the judiciary be free from political influence and bias 
in order to administer justice.  Thus it was provided that, once appointed, the justices be allowed to remain in 
their offices for life (or until voluntary retirement), and that their pay not be diminished in an effort to shelter 
the judiciary from volatile popular opinion and the influence of the legislature. 
 
 But beyond the basic principles of independence and impartiality, there was a lack of consensus and 
understanding among the founders with respect to how the soon to be independent justices would best be 
                                                
75 Idem 
76 This convention was held in Philadelphia and its original purpose was to amend the faulty Articles of Confederation 
which preceded the current American Constitution of 1787.  The convention thus became a stage for discussing the 
proper structure and role of government, and its debates offer an instructive window into the minds of the early 
American founders and their sentiments regarding the government that they were creating.  The record used forthwith 
was edited by Max Farrand and the passages referred to are all drawn from the notes of James Madison.    
77 Kesler, Charles R., & Rossiter, Clinton (Eds.), The Federalist Papers, p. 464. 
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utilized in the new government.  The debate over a proposal presented as the “Council of Revision” is 
particularly instructive when considering the various concepts of judicial participation presented at the 
convention.  Those who supported the Council of Revision proposed that a group of judges be combined 
with the executive and that the council be given a collective veto power over legislation.  The proposal was 
raised numerous times throughout the convention, and though it was ultimately rejected, it provided an arena 
for discussing the proper role that justices should play in the new government.  The most important 
discussions of the topic took place on June 4, June 6, July 21, and August 15. 
 
 The concept was first introduced on June 4, as an amendment to a proposal that the Executive 
exercise a veto power of the legislation of Congress.  On that day, Elbridge Gerry argued that the judiciary 
already held a “sufficient check [against] encroachment on their own department by the exposition of the 
laws, which involve a power of deciding on their Constitutionality” and Rufus King pointed out that judges 
“ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated 
in its formation.”78 
 
 The debate continued on June 6, and Gerry further argued that “the Executive, whilst standing alone 
[would] be more impartial than when he [could] be covered by the sanction & seduced by the sophistry of the 
Judges.”  King reminded the delegates that “[i]f the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of 
responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the Executive power.”  In response, 
James Madison maintained that only “a small part of the laws coming in question before a Judge [would] be 
such wherein he had been consulted,” but “much good on the other hand [would] proceed from the 
perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character [which] the Code of laws [would] receive from the 
Judiciary talents.”  A vote was taken and the proposal was defeated 8-3, but desires to return to the matter 
were expressed, and it was tabled for a later date.79 
 
 On July 21, the most extensive debate of the topic took place.  James Wilson argued for the proposal 
and maintained that “the Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating [against] projected 
encroachments on the people as well as on themselves.”  This opportunity should be granted, he argued, 
because “[l]aws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so 
unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect.”  But if the convention, [l]et them 
have a share in the Revisionary power” they would “have an opportunity of taking notice of these characters 
of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.”80 
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 Nathaniel Ghorum replied that he “did not see the advantage of employing the Judges in this way” 
because “[a]s judges they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of 
public measures.”  He later would argue that the proposal should be defeated on the grounds that “the Judges 
argued that “as the Judges will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown entirely out 
ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no prepossession with regard to them” and secondly, that “as 
the Judges will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown entirely out of the 
Executive hands, and instead of enabling him to defend himself, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.”81 
 
 Oliver Ellsworth spoke next in favor of the motion, and observed that “the Judges will give more 
wisdom & firmness to the Executive” because “[t]hey will possess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the 
laws, which the Executive can not be always expected to possess.”  In addition, he argued that “[t]he law of 
Nations will also come frequently into question” and in regards to such matters, “the Judges alone will have 
competent information.”82 
 
 James Madison added his support, maintaining first, that “[i]t would be useful to the Judiciary 
[department] by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself [against] Legislative encroachments.”  
Second, that “[i]t would be useful to the Executive, by inspiring additional confidence & firmness in exerting 
the revisionary power.”  And third, that “[i]t would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable assistance it 
would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity & technical propriety in the laws” which he 
stated were “qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our republican Codes.”  He also held 
that the proposal did not give too much power to the Executive and Judicial branches because it was likely 
that “notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch 
for them” because “[e]xperience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb 
all power into its vortex.”  Thus, he “could not discover in the proposed association of the Judges with the 
Executive in the Revisionary check on the Legislature any violation of the maxim which requires the great 
departments of power to kept separate & distinct” and “[o]n the contrary he thought it an auxiliary 
precaution in favor of the maxim.”83 
 
 Gerry once again opposed the proposal on the ground that “[i]t was combining & mixing together 
the Legislative & the other departments [and] was establishing an improper coalition between the Executive 
& Judiciary departments.”  He further argued that it was improperly “making Statesmen of the Judges” and 
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“setting them up as the guardians of the Rights of the people” when “the Representatives of the people” 
should be “the guardians of their Rights & interests.”84 
  
 Caleb Strong affirmed Gerry’s argument that “the power of making [the laws] ought to be kept 
distinct from the power of expounding, the laws” because “[t]he Judges, in exercising the function of 
expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing the laws.”85 
 
 Gouverneur Morris interjected that “[t]he interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable & so 
transitory, and his means of defending it so feeble, that there is the justest [sic] ground to fear his want of 
firmness in resisting encroachments.”  He “concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater danger from 
Legislative usurpations that from any other source” and “was extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary 
firmness & weight of the Judiciary would not supply the deficiency.”86 
 
 Luther Martin “considered the association of the Judges wtih the Executive as a dangerous 
innovation.”  He also maintained that “[a] knowledge of mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be 
presumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges than to the Legislature.”  Additionally, Martin held that 
“[a]s to the Constitutionality of the laws, that point will come before the Judges in their proper official 
character” and in that character they already had “a negative on the laws.”  Thus, if the convention “[j]oin 
them with the Executive in the Revision” the justices would possess a “a double negative.”  Martin concluded 
his remarks with the observation that “[i]t is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the confidence 
of the people” and that “[t]his will soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating agst. 
popular measures of the Legislatures.”87 
  
   George Mason responded that the legislature could “be expected frequently to pass unjust and 
pernicious laws” and that the proposal would have the effect of “hindering the final passage of such laws” 
and also “discourage demagogues from attempting to get them passed.”  He also pointed out that while 
judges “could declare an unconstitutional law void [...] with regard to every law however unjust, oppressive or 
pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as judges to 
give it a free course.”88 
 
                                                
84Idem, p. 75. 
85 Idem. 
86 Idem, p. 76 
87 Idem, pp. 76-77. 
88 Idem, p. 77. 
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 Wilson once again insisted that “the joint weight of the two departments was necessary to balance 
the single weight of the Legislature” adding that “a rule of voting might provide against [the justices excluding 
the Executive from the process].”89 
 
 Finally, John Rutledge stated that he thought “the Judges of all men the most unfit to be concerned 
in the revisionary Council” because “Judges ought never to give their opinion on a law till it comes before 
them.”  He also pointed out that the Executive would already have a council (his cabinet) and that “the 
Executive could advise with the officers of State, as of war, finance, &c. and avail himself of their information 
and opinions.”  A vote was taken, and came out 3 ayes, 4 noes, and 2 divided, and a final vote was once again 
postponed.90 
 
 On August 15, Madison made a final motion that “all acts before they become laws should be 
submitted both to the Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments, that if either of these should object 2/3 
of each house, if both should object 3/4 of each House should be necessary to overrule the objections and 
give to the acts the force of law.”  Charles Pinkney “opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative 
business [because] it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture to their opinions” and John 
Mercer went so far as to say that he “disapproved of the Doctrine that Judges as expositors of the 
Constitution should have authority to declare a law void.  He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously 
made, and then to be uncontroulable [sic].”  The vote was taken, the proposal was defeated by an 8-3 vote, 
and the veto power was subsequently assigned to the Executive alone.91 
 
 Though unsuccessful, the consideration of the motion for a Council of Revision makes it clear that 
some delegates believed that judges should participate in the legislative process, as a check on laws that were 
not only unconstitutional, but also unclear, vague, or otherwise harmful to society.  It also highlights the fact 
that many delegates believed the Legislative branch to be the most dangerous of the three branches, and the 
judiciary to possess only a small degree of power and influence.  In contrast, those who opposed the measure 
felt that the judiciary should not be involved in the lawmaking process, as their chief role was to be impartially 
resolving conflicts of law and that in this capacity they were sufficiently protected from encroachment by the 
other branches.  They also felt that the Executive should be free to act independently of the influence of 
judges in order that the accountability, autonomy, and efficiency of the office be retained, and believed that 
the political branches (i.e. the Legislative and Executive) would be the most responsive protectors of 
individual interests and rights, since they relied upon their constituencies for re-election. 
                                                
89 Idem, p. 79. 
90 Idem, p. 80. 
91 Idem, p. 298. 
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 Thus, the debates over the Council of Revision illustrate that there was no clear consensus 
demonstrated by the founders with respect to an idyllic function of justices in the American legal system.92  
The judiciary was designed as an independent body, but there was no concrete function established for it to 
perform.  Next, we will consider whether the Constitution itself provides satisfactory description and 
direction concerning the role that a judge is to play in American society. 
 
On the constitutional parameters of the judiciary  
 
 The lack of extensive debate and consideration of the role of the judiciary at the convention is 
reflected in language outlining the constitutional parameters of the judicial branch is asserted in Article III of 
the American Constitution and is quite limited in volume.  Section 1 addresses the structure of the judiciary 
and the tenure of the justices.  It reads, 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office.93 
 
 Thus, the Constitution explicitly only establishes one court, the Supreme Court, and leaves to 
Congress the responsibility of expanding the judicial branch.  Additionally, the Constitution provides that 
justices hold their office during good behavior and that their salaries may not be diminished, in an effort to 
protect their judgment from being influenced by popular political positions and the machinations of the 
legislature.  The Constitution provides no definite number stating how many justices are to comprise the 
Supreme Court, once again leaving the details to the discretion of Congress. 
 
 Section 2 deals with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and also contains instruction 
concerning jury trials.  Part of this section was modified by Amendment XI,94 but the portion remaining in 
force reads, 
                                                
92 While the motion to allow the justices to take part in the law-making process was defeated by an 8-3 margin, many 
reasons were provided throughout the debate as to why the proposal was objectionable and one should hesitate to draw 
general conclusions from the results of the final vote. 
93 Article II, § 2 provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint [...] Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law” (i.e. other federal judges). 
94 Amendment XI (ratified February 7, 1795) states “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state” thus overriding the original language providing that “[The judicial 
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The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a 
party [...] between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming 
lands under grants of different States [...] 
 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which 
a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other 
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to 
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial 
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not 
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may 
by Law have directed. 
 
 The judicial power thus extends to all “cases and controversies” in “law and equity” arising under the 
Constitution.  While the meaning and import of these key phrases will be discussed in more detail later, at the 
present it is enough to note that the authority of the federal judiciary is founded upon the Constitution, and 
that the insertion of the word “equity” suggests that the founders anticipated that in some cases a judgment 
of fairness would need to be supplied by the justices.  It should also be noted that once again Congress is 
provided with a degree of influence over the judiciary by means of expanding or limiting the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.  Additionally, juries are to play a key role in the American system, thus incorporating 
the general population into the system of justice. 
 
 Finally, Section 3 defines treason and sets forth guidelines for convicting individuals of treason.  It 
reads,  
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in 
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of 
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession 
in open Court. 
 
The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of 
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person 
attainted. 
 
 Thus ends Article III, the shortest of the first three Articles of the Constitution, which outline the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches respectively.  Notably absent is any description as to the 
qualifications or powers of justices and the role they are to play in government.  And while the structure of 
                                                                                                                                                       
power shall extend] to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizen of another State [...] and 
between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.” 
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the judiciary has been expanded and supplemented significantly by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and other 
subsequent acts of Congress, the archetypal American judge has remained undefined. 
 
II. On the Power of Judicial Review 
 
On the early influence of the judicial branch in America  
 
 In spite its uncertain beginnings, the judicial branch established itself as an integral part of the 
American system of government, leading Tocqueville to famously observe, “[t]here is almost no political 
question in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question.”95  Tocqueville 
elaborated, 
What a foreigner understands only with the greatest difficulty in the United States is the 
judicial organization.  There is so to speak no political event in which he does not hear the 
authority of the judge invoked; and he naturally concludes that in the United States the 
judge is one of the prime political powers.  When, next, he comes to examine the 
constitution of the courts, he discovers at first only judicial prerogatives and habits in them.  
In his eyes the magistrate never seems to be introduced into public affairs except by chance, 
but this same chance recurs every day.96 
 
 Thus, although the courts were unable to produce legislation and their rulings are limited to the cases 
that come before them, even early on in the history of the United States they exerted a noticeable influence 
over the political realm.  Tocqueville explained that this was because “[t]here are in fact very few laws of a 
nature to escape judicial analysis for long, for there are very few that do not hurt an individual interest and 
that litigants cannot or will not invoke before the courts.”97  Though in Tocqueville’s time the Supreme 
Court’s workload was still fairly moderate, his observation bears particular relevance today.  America has 
grown into a complex, expanded republic where there exists an extremely large pool of individual interests.  
In such a society, a court with the appellate base that the Supreme Court possesses has access to nearly every 
(if not every) important political question of its era.  Thus, as the republic has expanded, the discretion of the 
Supreme Court has also expanded, and its influence increased significantly. 
 
 An even more important factor that contributed to the expansion of judicial influence in America 
was the power of judicial review.  The power of judicial review was firmly established in the court case 
Marbury v. Madison in 1803.  In order to comprehend this important judicial power, it is helpful to review the 
roles of the Constitution and laws in American society. 
 
                                                
95 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 257. 
96 Idem, p. 93. 
97 Idem, p. 96. 
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On the general authority of a written constitution 
 
 It should be noted that the Court is not only limited to cases brought before it by the citizenry, but 
those cases must also be shown to arise under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and must be 
resolved by the same.  Thus, although the judicial system of the United States inherited many common law 
traditions from its Anglo origins, the justices are not able to exercise unlimited discretion when resolving 
disputes.  Rather, they must show that their judgments conform to the principles enumerated in the 
Constitution and subsequent laws adopted by Congress. 
 
 To understand why this is so, it is important to understand the nature of a written Constitution.  The 
philosopher Thomas Paine expounded the role of a Constitution, stating that  
A Constitution is a thing antecedent to a Government, and a Government is only the creature 
of a Constitution.  The Constitution of a country is not the act of its Government, but of 
the people constituting a Government.  It is the body of elements, to which you can refer, 
and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the Government 
shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organised, [sic] the powers it shall have, 
the mode of elections, the duration of Parliaments, or by what other name such bodies may 
be called; the powers which the executive part of the Government shall have; and in fine, 
everything that relates tot he complete organisation [sic] of a civil Government, and the 
principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall be bound.  A Constitution, therefore, is 
to a Government what the laws made afterwards by that Government are to a Court of 
Judicature.  The Court of Judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it 
only acts in conformity to the laws made:  and the Government is in like manner governed 
by the Constitution.98 
 
 Thus, the judicial branch and all other parts of the government are bound to conform to the 
principles of the Constitution, as constitutions are not produced by an act of government, but are created 
antecedent to the establishment of government.  Paine explains that this distinction is of paramount 
importance because “[a] Government on the principles on which constitutional Governments arising out of 
society are established, cannot have the right of altering itself.  If it had, it would be arbitrary.  It might make 
itself what it pleased; and wherever such a right is set up, it shows there is no Constitution.”99 
 
On the purpose of laws in general 
 
 Thus, according to the political theory at the roots of the American system, a Constitution is not 
formed by an act of government and therefore a distinction must be drawn between the Constitution itself 
and subsequent laws that are in fact acts of government.  Additionally, as the Constitution may not be altered 
                                                
98 Paine, Common Sense, Rights of Man, and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine, p. 173. 
99 Idem, p. 175 
  44 
 
by an act of government, the Constitution and subsequent laws do not reside on the same plane of authority.  
Publius observed in Federalist #78 that “[t]here is no position which depends on clearer principles than that 
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.  
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”100 
 
 This principle established, the question remained, which portion of government would ensure that 
legislative acts contrary to the constitution be declared void?  Publius continued, 
the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature 
in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.  
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.  A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law.  It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular 
act proceeding from the legislative body.  If there should happen to be an irreconcilable 
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of 
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the 
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.101 
 
 Thus, according to Publius, the judiciary was to fulfill the role of resolving conflicts between the 
Constitution and laws.  However, the Anti-Federalists were opposed to the judiciary exercising that power.  
The Anti-Federalist Brutus warned that 
[t]he judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of the constitution 
in law, but also in equity. 
 
By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of 
it, without being confined to the words or letter[...] 
 
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time 
come before them.  And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or 
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and 
spirit of the constitution.  The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will 
have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can 
correct their errors, or control their adjudications.  From this court there is no appeal.  And 
I conceive the legislature themselves, cannot set aside a judgment of this court, because they 
are authorised [sic] by the constitution to decide in the last resort.  The legislature must be 
controled [sic] by the constitution, and not the constitution by them.102 
 
 Thus, in Brutus’ mind, it was not the legislature that threatened the autonomy of the Supreme Court, 
but rather the Court that threatened the autonomy of the Congress.  This was particularly troubling to Brutus, 
for he felt that because the Supreme Court was part of the federal government, it would be naturally 
prejudiced towards the national interests when they came into conflict with individual or state rights.  He 
observed that 
                                                
100 Kesler, Charles R., & Rossiter, Clinton (Eds.), The Federalist Papers, p. 465-466. 
101 Idem, p. 466 
102 Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.), The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, p. 295 - 296. 
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this constitution, if it is ratified, will not be a compact entered into by states, in their 
corporate capacities, but an agreement of the people of the United States, as one great body 
politic, no doubt can remain, but that the great end of the constitution, if it is to be collected 
from the preamble, in which its end is declared, is to constitution a government which is to 
extend to every case for which any government is instituted, whether external or internal.  
The courts, therefore, will establish this as a principle in expounding the constitution, and 
will give every part of it such an explanation, as will give latitude to every department under 
it, to take cognizance of every matter, not only that affects the general and national concerns 
of the union, but also of such as relate to the administration of private justice, and to 
regulating the internal and local affairs of the different parts.103 
 
 Brutus concluded that “[t]he supreme court [would] then have a right, independent of the legislature, 
to give a construction to the constitution and every part of it, and there is no power provided in this system 
to correct their construction or do it away.  If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the 
sense the judges put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their power 
is superior to that of the legislature.”104 
 
 The Federalists response was that the Constitution did not “suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power.  It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and that the will of 
the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, 
the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former.  They ought to regulate their decisions 
by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental.”105  Additionally, Publius explained 
that that “[u]ntil the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established 
form, it is binding upon themselves collectively as well as individually; and no presumption, or even 
knowledge of their sentiments can warrant their representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.106”  
They also maintained, as observed earlier, that the judiciary had no access to “the purse” or to “the sword,” 
and was in actuality powerless to enforce its own decrees.  Finally, the Federalists emphasized the role the 
Court would play as “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society” by not 
only “serv[ing] to moderate the immediate mischiefs [sic] of those [unjust and partial laws] which may have 
been passed” but also “operat[ing] as a check upon the legislative body in passing them” for Congress 
“perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the 
courts, [would be] compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.107” 
 
 It is interesting to note that Publius equated the Constitution with the will of the people “declared in 
the Constitution” rather than the will of the people “declared in the moment of judgment,” and that he 
                                                
103 Idem, p. 300. 
104 Idem, p. 307. 
105Kesler, Charles R., & Rossiter, Clinton (Eds.), The Federalist Papers, p. 466.  
106 Idem, p. 468 
107 Idem, 469. 
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characterized the Court as a “safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.”  It would 
appear then, that insofar as the justices were charged with upholding the Constitution, it was understood that 
in that capacity they were to protect the interests of society as established in that document.   
 
 Publius’ reference to the amendment process is also intriguing, for it suggests that any additional 
protections or policy provided by the Court in areas not addressed by the Constitution would have to be 
preceded by an amendment authorizing such protections or policy.  If this was Publius’ understanding, it 
becomes easier to understand why he remained unconcerned with the powers granted to the judiciary, for he 
would have envisioned them as being exercised within the parameters of a limited sphere of influence.  
However, as Brutus pointed out, no explicit language in the Constitution forbade the justices from abusing 
their powers, and since it allocated to the justices autonomous, lifetime appointments, no practical safeguards 
protected against potential “ill humors” of the justices. 
 
Marbury v. Madison 
 
 Although the power of judicial review was discussed during the debates over ratifying the 
Constitution, the power was not explicitly provided for in the Constitution and therefore if it was to be 
acquired by the judiciary it had to be established in practice.  The opportunity came when the Supreme Court 
considered the case Marbury v. Madison.  Marbury had been nominated as a federal judge by President Adams, 
had been confirmed by the Senate, and his commission had been signed and sealed with the Seal of the 
United States.  However, before the commission was delivered, the Adams administration was replaced by 
the Jefferson administration, and Jefferson’s new Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the 
commission.   
 
 The Court determined that Marbury had a right to the judgeship and that he should be provided a 
remedy by the government, but that the particular remedy demanded by Marbury could not be provided by 
the Court.  Marbury had appealed to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that the Supreme Court could 
issue writs of mandamus, which required government officials to perform certain acts, in cases of original 
jurisdiction.  However, the Court ruled that the language of Article III outlining the original jurisdiction of the 
Court comprised the entire expanse of the Court’s authority in that realm, and that therefore the act of 
Congress providing for the issuing of writs of mandamus was unconstitutional and void. 
 
 What is immediately relevant to our present discussion is the theoretical reasoning utilized by the 
Court.  Chief Justice John Marshall issued the opinion, which first established that the government of the 
United States was one of limited government.  He stated, 
  47 
 
 
the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, 
in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole 
American fabric had been erected.  The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; 
nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated.  The principles, therefore, so established, 
are deemed fundamental.  And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and 
can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. 
 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different 
departments their respective powers.  It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not 
to be transcended by those departments. 
 
The government of the United States is of the latter description.  The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the Constitution is written.  To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended 
to be restrained?  The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers 
is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if 
acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation.  It is a proposition too plain to be 
contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the 
legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.108 
 
 Thus, as observed earlier, since the Constitution preceded the formation of government and 
represented the will of the people, it holds a higher level of authority than laws passed by Congress.  Next, 
Chief Justice Marshall established that it was in fact the role of the judiciary to resolve conflicts between the 
law and Constitution.  He observed that 
 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that 
rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 
 
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to 
a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the 
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of the very 
essence of judicial duty. 
 
If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the 
case to which both apply.109 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
108 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 176-177 (1803). 
109 Idem, at 177-178. 
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IV. On the Challenges of Judicial Interpretation 
 
 With the principle of judicial review firmly established in legal precedent, the power of the judicial 
branch increased significantly.  Although the power was initially rarely invoked, it was appealed to more and 
more as the laws and problems of society became more and more complex, and now it is rare for a significant 
Supreme Court case to be resolved without considering the constitutionality of the matter at hand.  As this 
process unfolded and the will of justices began to replace the will of the legislatures more frequently, the 
Court began to be accused of judicial activism, or founding their judgments upon obscure legal reasoning that 
ultimately supported their own personal opinions instead of the Constitution or established law.  
 
 While most discussions of judicial activism deal with specific cases and attempt to reveal and criticize 
various political agendas of the Court, the present discussion will merely consider the difficulties of 
interpreting the law and attempt to reach a method that conforms to and upholds the principles of the 
American founding.110 
 
On the difficulties of interpreting law 
 
 It should be noted that no case comes before the judicial branch unless it involves a difficult question 
of law or equity.  Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed, “[t]he law is at best an inexact science, and the 
cases our Court takes to decide are frequently ones upon which able judges in lower courts have disagreed.  
There simply is no demonstrably ‘right’ answer to the question involved in many of our difficult cases.111”  
Similarly, Justice Felix Frankfurter declared “there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for ever 
political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power.  The Framers, carefully and with 
deliberate forethought, refused so to enthrone the judiciary.112” 
 
 These statements from prominent judges may seem remarkable, as the judiciary is often portrayed as 
a champion of liberty and defender of justice.  But though it might seem that there should be a fair and just 
resolution to every question, when one reflects upon the number of interests and the various laws that must 
be considered in complex cases, it becomes easy to comprehend why the law may be called “an inexact 
science.”  Thus, even the most learned legal minds may disagree on various matters, as is evident by the 
                                                
110 It should be noted that those who attempt to utilize methods of judicial interpretation as a means to achieve political 
policy, whether they be liberal or conservative, are themselves guilty of the very indiscretion that they accuse the 
infamous “activist judges” of.  Impartiality is the ideal that defines the judiciary, and when the ideal of impartiality is 
sacrificed for other political ideals, however noble the cause, both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the judiciary 
suffer. 
111 Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, p. 255. 
112 Baker v. Carr (dissent), 369 U.S. 270 (1962). 
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numerous concurring and dissenting opinions issued by the courts.113  It should also be noted that the Court 
is also limited in its ability to remedy injustices by the vast number of petitions it receives.  The time and 
resources of the Court are not infinite, and therefore some cases must necessarily be neglected in order to 
responsibly address any issues at all.  Finally, as Justice Frankfurter seems to suggest, perhaps the Framers felt 
that there should not be a judicial remedy for every problem and designed the judiciary to be bound by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  Perhaps the Framers envisioned that the great problems of the 
day being solved by the peoples’ representatives in Congress and that alterations in government be provided 
the people themselves.  Or perhaps the laws and Constitution are too restrictive, and law is in actuality an 
“exact” and easy science if the judges are allowed to exercise a proper degree of discretion when resolving 
injustices. 
 
On modern theories of judicial interpretation 
 
 The fundamental question of whether or not the Constitution should be interpreted strictly or 
loosely is the subject of much debate, and various modern theories of judicial interpretation have emerged.  
There are numerous scholars with numerous theories, but for the purposes of this treatise we will not 
examine their intricacies and variations.  Rather, we will merely consider the basic arguments for a strict 
constructionist approach to interpreting the Constitution, and a loose constructionist approach to interpreting 
the Constitution respectively.114 
 
 Proponents of strict constructionism often appeal to the concept of “original understanding,” 
meaning that the Constitution must be understood as promoting and protecting the principles understood by 
those who established it.  The legal scholar Robert Bork summarizes the position as follows: 
When we speak of “law,” we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to change except 
through prescribed procedures.  That statement assumes that the rule has a meaning 
independent of our own desires.  Otherwise there would be no need to agree on procedures 
for changing the rule.  Statutes, we agree, may be changed by amendments or repeal.  The 
Constitution may be changed by amendment pursuant to the procedures set out in article V.  
It is a necessary implication of the prescribed procedures that neither statute nor 
Constitution should be changed by judges [...]  
 
What is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change?  It is the meaning understood 
at the time of the law’s enactment [....]  The search is not for a subjective intention [...] [n]or 
would the subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying convention alter anything.  
When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words ordinarily mean [....] 
                                                
113 A concurring opinion is issued when a justice agrees with the outcome of the majority, but supports alternate 
reasoning.  A dissenting opinion is issued when a justice disagrees with the ruling of the majority.  
114 Each individual theory of interpretation necessarily includes a method for interpreting statutory law, and other forms 
of disputes.  However, for the purposes of this treatise, we will only focus on arguments concerning Constitutional 
interpretation. 
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Law is a public act.  Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing.  All that counts is 
how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time.  The 
original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such 
as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the 
time, and the like.115 
 
 Thus, a judge who founded his or her interpretation upon an original understanding of the 
Constitution would seek to understand what the provision was initially designed to accomplish, consider any 
Amendments to the Constitution that may be relevant to the matter, and make a ruling based upon the 
original principles of the document.  There are various criticisms of this approach.  It is often described as an 
attempt to subject the living to restrictive rule by the interests and principles of the dead.  Many of its 
detractors also argue that original understanding is often unclear and difficult to determine, particularly in this 
day and age when centuries have passed since the founding era. 
 
 A similar process has been described by Justice Antonin Scalia, which he has labeled “textualism.”  
He establishes first that “[e]very issue of law resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of text--the 
text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution.116”  Next, he maintains that “[g]overnment by 
unexpressed intent is [...] tyrannical” and therefore “[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver” 
and “[m]en may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.117”  A textualist 
judge, therefore, recognizes that the text is the key to interpreting the matter, and that the intent must be 
manifest within the language of that text, otherwise the citizenry could never be informed of the law and the 
sovereign would necessarily be acting in a tyrannical and arbitrary matter.   
 
 This approach is often criticized as close-minded and limiting to the Court, but as Scalia explains, 
that is precisely the point, for a textualist believes that it is not the role of the Court to produce extraneous 
language to resolve a dispute when no such language has been provided.  Scalia continues, 
To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too dull to perceive the broader social 
purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to serve; or too hidebound to 
realize that new times require new laws.  One need only hold the belief that judges have no 
authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws [...] 
 
[W]hile a good textualist is not a literalist, neither is he a nihilist.  Words do not have a 
limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is 
permissible.118 
 
                                                
115 Bork, The Tempting of America, pp. 143-144. 
116 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, p. 13 
117 Idem, p. 17. 
118 Idem, pp. 23-24. 
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 The concept of a “limited range of meaning” is often frustrating to those who would use the Courts 
as a tool for broad social reform, or even for rectifying individual cases of injustice.  Thus, many scholars 
maintain that in this complex era where multiple interests need to be balanced and changing social values 
need to assessed, that the Court should be given broad discretion and interpret the Constitution loosely in 
order to meet the needs of modern day society.   
 
 This method is often referred to as the “living-Constitution” approach, meaning the Constitution is a 
living document whose meaning evolves over time in accordance to the norms of the day.  While most 
theories supporting this view are quite complex,119 a succinct statement of the position was provided by 
Justice William J. Brennan in the case Gregg v. Georgia.  The case involved the Constitutionality of the death 
penalty, and in his dissent he referred to the language of an earlier case and argued that “[t]he Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’120”  In a later speech at Georgetown University, he reiterated his support for 
the concept of an “evolving standard of decency,” stating, 
[I]f the interaction of this Justice and the constitutional text over the years confirms any 
single proposition, it is that the demands of human dignity will never cease to evolve [...] 
 
If we are to be a shining city upon a hill, it will be because of our ceaseless pursuit of the 
constitutional ideal of human dignity.  For the political and legal ideals that form the 
foundation of much that is best in American institutions-ideals jealously preserved and 
guarded throughout our history-still form the vital force in creative political thought and 
activity within the nation today.  As we adapt our institutions to the ever-changing 
conditions of national and international life, those ideals of human dignity-liberty and justice 
for all individuals-will continue to inspire and guide us because they are entrenched in our 
Constitution.  The Constitution with its Bill of Rights thus has a bright future, as well as a 
glorious past, for its spirit is inherent in the aspirations of our people.121 
 
 Thus, those who support a loose constructionist approach to interpretation portray the Constitution 
as a tool for championing the ideals of American society and perceive the courts as the most effective means 
for rectifying social injustice.  However, those who oppose the living-constitution approach argue that 
because the Supreme Court may only be overruled by the difficult process of amending the Constitution, 
granting the justices broad discretionary powers ultimately results in society being ruled by the standards of an 
elite faction.  Such an objection was raised by Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, in a dissent to the Court’s opinion 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford.  He observed that  
                                                
119 For a more extensive treatment of the living-constitution doctrine, see the works of Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely, 
and Lawrence Tribe. 
120 Greg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
121 Brennan, “The Great Debate,” Georgetown University, 12 Oct. 1985.  
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[t]o engraft on any instrument a substantive exception not found in it, must be admitted to 
be a matter attended with great difficulty.  And the difficulty increases with the importance 
of the instrument, and the magnitude and complexity of the interests involved in its 
construction.  To allow this to be done with the Constitution, upon reasons purely political, 
renders its judicial interpretation impossible--because judicial tribunals, as such, cannot 
decide upon political considerations.  Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to 
afford rules of juridical interpretation [....]  And when a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is 
abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we 
have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the 
time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of 
what it ought to mean.  When such a method of interpretation of the Constitution obtains, 
in place of a republican Government, with limited and defined powers, we have a 
Government which is merely an exponent of the will of Congress; or, what, in my opinion, 
would not be preferable, an exponent of the individual political opinions of the members of 
this court.122 
 
 Thus, it would seem that there are inherent weaknesses in both positions.  Those who advocate a 
strict approach to interpretation are forced to rely upon external sources to determine the original intent of 
legislation and give significant weight to the reasoning of earlier generations, with the result being that in 
some cases the current values of society are neglected.  Those who advocate textualism must limit themselves 
to the text before them, which in some cases might limit their ability to resolve conflicts.  Finally, those who 
support the idea of a living-constitution risk subjecting society to judge-made policy, which would seem to 
conflict with democratic and republican principles.   
 
 These difficulties have led some to despair, and conclude that as there is no manner of interpretation 
that is clearly ideal, the citizens must resign themselves to the evils of whatever method the majority of the 
Court chooses to follow.  However, such an outlook assumes that the process of determining the meaning of 
law may only be influenced by the actions of judges, and ignores other possible avenues of resolving legal 
questions.  Next, we will examine the role of the people in the American system of government, and how the 
citizens might safeguard their rights and interests without relying upon the Court to resolve every significant 
matter of law. 
 
V. On the Role of the People in the American System 
 
On the role of the citizenry in general 
 
 What is curiously overlooked in modern commentary on the American system of government is the 
role and duties of the American people.  This is quite remarkable, for as we have seen, the interests of the 
                                                
122Dred Scott v. Sandford (dissent), 60 U.S. 563 (1856). 
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people and their participation were central themes in early American political debates.  Occasionally, the poor 
level of political efficacy and the apathy of the citizenry is remarked upon and lamented, but rarely are the 
people perceived as a possible solution; rather, the uneducated masses are seen as an obstacle to progress. 
 
 There are numerous evidences that the Founders envisioned the American people participating 
actively in government and taking upon themselves the responsibility of safeguarding their rights from the 
encroachment of government.  An often overlooked principle of natural rights philosophy is the principle 
that “[e]very generation is equal in rights to the generations which preceded it, by the same rule that every 
individual is born equal in rights with his contemporary.123”  Thomas Paine expounded this principle by 
explaining that  
[t]here never did, there never will, and there never can, exist a Parliament, or any description 
of men, or any generation of men, in any country, possessed of the right or the power of 
binding and controuling [sic] posterity to the “end of time,” or of commanding for ever how 
the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it [....]  Every age and generation must be 
as free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it [....] Every 
generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require.  It is 
the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.  When man ceases to be, his 
power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns 
of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how 
its Government shall be organised, [sic] or how administered [...] 
 
It requires but a very small glance of thought to perceive that altho’ laws made in one 
generation often continue in force through succeeding generations, yet that they continue to 
derive their force from the consent of the living.  A law not repealed continues in force, not 
because it cannot be repealed, but because it is not repealed; and the non-repealing passes for 
consent.124 
 
 Thus, according to natural rights philosophy, each generation possesses the right and responsibility 
of protecting its interests.  This does not mean that the laws must constantly be replaced or that a revolution 
must take place when each generation comes of age.  Rather, the citizens in each generation are expected to 
consider the state of the laws and government before them, and if it does not meet their needs, they are to 
produce new legislation or amendments to the Constitution so that their needs are realized. 
 
 Additionally, early American documents reflect an understanding that the people are to actively 
defend their rights from oppressive forces.  The language of the Declaration of Independence states, 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of 
                                                
123Paine, Common Sense, Rights of Man, and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine, p. 167.  
124Idem, pp. 138-139, 141. 
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the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation 
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
to effect their Safety and Happiness. 
 
Such language suggests that, at least in the ideal sense, the people collectively are able to best ascertain their 
interests and mobilize themselves in an effort to preserve their rights.125  The Constitution begins by 
proclaiming that  
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
 
Thus, the ultimate authority of the present Constitution and the government it sets up rests in the hands of 
the people themselves, and not in any local, state, or national government entity. 
 
 Moreover, in the early days of the republic, the people were appealed to on many occasions to 
actively consider their rights and privileges and ensure that government sufficiently addressed the needs of 
society.  In Federalist #1, Publius directed the people to individually consider the importance of the proposed 
Constitution, to consider its merits, consider the public interest, and to accept or reject it based upon 
conclusions drawn from rational inquiry.126  Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, James Madison felt 
that a “new doctrine” which “ascribe[d] to the executive the prerogative of judging and deciding whether 
there be causes of war or not, in the obligations of treaties” threatened the interests of the new republic and 
its citizens.127  Interestingly, in addition to exercising his political influence within the corridors of 
government, he engaged in a public discourse with Alexander Hamilton, and under the pseudonym Helvidius, 
declared: 
[I]n proportion as [such] doctrines make their way into the creed of the government, and the 
acquiescence of the public, every power that can be deduced from them, will be deduced 
and exercised sooner or later by those who may have an interest in so doing.  The character 
of human nature gives this salutary warning to every sober and reflecting mind.  And the 
history of government, in all its forms and in every period of time, ratifies the danger.  A 
people, therefore, who are so happy as to possess the inestimable blessing of a free and 
defined constitution, cannot be too watchful against the introduction, nor too critical in 
tracing the consequences, of new principles and new constructions, that may remove the 
landmarks of power.128 
 
                                                
125 It might be objected that the Declaration was not produced by the collective will of the colonies, but rather the labor 
of an elite group of men who ascertained the needs of society and acted upon their convictions.  While we should be 
careful to give too much weight to the language of the Declaration, we should also note that much of what it proclaimed 
was based in theory, and not upon practical application and experience.  We can therefore infer that, at least in an ideal 
sense, the people were to be actively involved in determining their fate. 
126Kesler, Charles R., & Rossiter, Clinton (Eds.), The Federalist Papers, p. 27-31. 
127Frisch, Morton J. (Ed.), The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794, p. 84. 
128 Idem, p. 85. 
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 Thus, initially it was understood that the people would exercise their personal faculties of reason and 
participate not only in setting up the American system of government, but also in constantly monitoring the 
actions of their new government.  They were expected to recognize and respond to any threats to their 
personal liberties.  However, with time these important concepts of civic duty and citizen virtue appear to 
have faded in the minds of the American people.  
 
On Tocqueville’s “equality of servitude” 
 
 While such a turn of events might seem to be extraordinary, even in the early days of the republic the 
seeds of apathy were recognized by Tocqueville, and he warned that the United States was a country in 
danger of succumbing to what he called “equality of servitude.”  This weakness stems from the inherent 
American love for two ideals:  “equality” and “liberty.”  As these ideals sometimes come into conflict with 
each other, the people are in constant danger of choosing equality over liberty.  Tocqueville explains, 
There is in fact a manly and legitimate passion for equality that incites men to want all to be 
strong and esteemed.  This passion tends to elevate the small to the rank of the great; but 
one also encounters a depraved taste for equality in the human heart that brings the weak to 
want to draw the strong to their level and that reduces men to preferring equality in 
servitude to inequality in freedom.  It is not that peoples whose social state is democratic 
naturally scorn freedom; on the contrary, they have an instinctive taste for it.  But freedom 
is not the principal and continuous object of their desire; what they love with an eternal love 
is equality; they dash toward freedom with a rapid impulse and sudden efforts, and if they 
miss the goal they resign themselves; but nothing can satisfy them without equality, and they 
would sooner consent to perish than to lose it. 
 
On the other hand, when citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes difficult for them to 
defend their independence against the aggressions of power.  Since no one among them is 
strong enough then to struggle alone to advantage, it is only the combination of the forces 
of all that can guarantee freedom.129 
 
 According to Tocqueville, the desire for equality leads individuals to submit their individual 
autonomy to a central power and focus on individualistic, selfish pursuits.  This is because, 
[a]s conditions are equalized in a people, individual appear smaller and society seems greater, 
or rather, each citizen, having become like all the others, is lost in the crowd, and one no 
longer perceives [anything] but the vast and magnificent image of the people itself. 
 
This naturally gives men in democratic times a very high opinion of the privileges of society 
and a very humble idea of the rights of the individual.  They readily accept that the interest 
of the former is everything and that of the latter, nothing.  They willing enough grant that 
the power representing society possesses much more enlightenment and wisdom than any 
of the men who compose it, and that its duty as well as its right is to take each citizen by the 
hand and lead him.130 
 
                                                
129 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 6. 
130 Idem, p. 641. 
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 The end result of this development is described by Tocqueville in chilling prophetic language.  He 
maintained that in America there would come to be  
an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who revolve on themselves without repose, 
procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with which they fill their souls.  Each of them, 
withdrawn and apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the others:  his children and his 
particular friends form the whole human species for him; as for dwelling with his fellow 
citizens, he is beside them, but he does not see them; he touches them and does not feel 
them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone, and if a family still remains for him, 
one can at least say that he no longer has a native country. 
 
Above these an immense tutelary power is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring 
their enjoyments and watching over their fate.  It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, 
and mild.  It would resemble paternal power if, like that, it had for its object to prepare men 
for manhood; but on the contrary, it seeks only to keep the fixed irrevocably in childhood; it 
likes citizens to enjoy themselves provided that they think only of enjoying themselves.  It 
willingly works for their happiness; but it wants to be the unique agent and sole arbiter of 
that; it provides for their security, foresees and secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, 
conducts their principal affairs, directs their industry, regulates their estates, divides their 
inheritances; can it not take away from them entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of 
living? 
 
So it is that every day it renders the employment of free will less useful and more rare; it 
confines the action of the will in a smaller space and little by little steals the very use of free 
will from each citizen.  Equality has prepared men for all these things:  it has disposed them 
to tolerate them and often even to regard them as a benefit [....] 
 
[They] are incessantly racked by two inimical passions:  they feel the need to be led and the 
wish to remain free.  Not being able to destroy either one of these contrary instincts, they 
strive to satisfy both at the same time.  They imagine a unique power, tutelary, all powerful, 
but elected by citizens.  They combine centralization and the sovereignty of the people.  
That gives them some respite.  They console themselves for being in tutelage by thinking 
that they themselves have chosen their schoolmasters.  Each individual allows himself to be 
attached because he sees that it is not a man or a class but the people themselves that hold 
the end of the chain. 
 
In this system citizens leave their dependence for a moment to indicate their master, and  
then reenter it.131 
 
 While the language of Tocqueville is perhaps a bit dramatic and extreme, the dangers he warns 
against are very real threats to democratic governments, and their seeds, if not the fruits, are visibly apparent 
in American society today.  Many American citizens are content to trust that their political party of choice will 
supply them with “tutelary” candidates that are wise enough to protect their interests in general.  Some 
ceremoniously “leave their dependence for a moment to indicate their master” at the polls, while others 
simply ignore politics altogether unless their lives for some reason become directly affected by an injustice, at 
which point they cry out in anger that their government is unresponsive and ineffective. 
                                                
131 Idem, p. 663-664. 
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 But what they do not realize is that it is their own inactivity that has produced such a sorry state of 
affairs, and the remedy is not to replace the offending “tutelary” power with an alternative “tutelary” power.  
If their interests are to be secured, they must first determine for themselves what those interests are and force 
their representatives in the political branches of government132 to recognize those interests or lose their 
power.  In a government that allows for citizen participation, individual liberties are best protected by the 
actions of the individuals themselves.133 
 
VI. On How the People of America May Properly Utilize the Judiciary 
 
 Thus, we see that in the beginning of the republic, the American people were considered an 
important, if not the most important, part of the political world.  This must be taken into consideration when 
determining the proper role of the judiciary in American society. 
 
 The designers of the American political system took great care to set the judges apart as impartial 
that they might produce fair and just assessments of the laws presented before them.  From this it may be 
inferred that judges were not intended to resolve political matters, but that such matters were to be left to the 
other branches of government directly accountable to the people for re-election.  However, the courts were 
perceived as guardians of the rights of the people, and a means to rectify wrongs inflicted upon the people.  
Thus, in cases where no political solution has been provided to remedy an injustice, the question necessarily 
arises, what action are the courts entitled to make?  Must the judges been limited to the text before them, or 
ancient standards of conflict resolution, or should they be allowed to exercise their own discretion and 
resolve the matter at hand? 
 
 If our solution is limited to the courses of actions available to the judges alone, it appears that we are 
presented with a pitiful situation.  If we limit the judges to the text, injustices may go unpunished.  If we allow 
                                                
132 That is, the Legislative and Executive branches. 
133It might be objected that the current state of affairs makes such an effort an impossible task, and that the citizenry has 
degenerated to such a point that they lack to ability and focus to participate in government.  It also may be objected that 
a stable policy-making elite is a better method of promoting the general welfare.  Indeed, Tocqueville himself observed 
that “[l]egislative instability is an evil inherent in democratic government because it is of the nature of democracies to 
bring new men to power [....] laws have the least duration [...] the action of the legislator never slows [...] The majority 
being the sole power that is important to please, the works that it undertakes are eagerly agreed to; but from the moment 
that its attention goes elsewhere, all efforts cease.”  However, it must be remembered that the purpose of this treatise is 
not to consider the practicality of the recommended solutions, but merely to consider threats to the American 
foundation of faith and what course of action would most effectively protect and preserve the original principles of 
American society.  It is up to the American people to determine whether those principles are worth preserving, and 
whether they are willing to contribute the effort necessary to do so. 
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justices to remedy all injustice as they see fit, we are subjecting society to rule by a few unelected, 
unaccountable individuals. 
 
 What seems to have been forgotten by the American people is that they are provided with numerous 
means to remedy unclear or outdated law.  The American Constitution not only allows the citizens to 
influence the legislative process through participating in elections, but it also provides them with a means to 
amend the document itself and restructure the foundations of their government as they see fit.  Though this 
process was designed to be difficult in order to guard against instability and volatile public opinion, it is not 
an impossible feat to pass a Constitutional amendment.  The process has been accomplished on numerous 
occasions throughout American history, and has provided the nation with many significant changes to its 
government and much social reform.  It should also be noted that while the rulings of the Supreme Court 
establish precedent that governs all lower courts and consequently the entire nation, they may be overruled by 
Constitutional amendment.  In spite of claims to the contrary, the system still grants the highest command 
over the operations and limits of their government to the people.134 
 
 Thus, if the American people wish to retain their influence over their government and its law, they 
must take action and begin to participate in that government.  If the law is to remain founded upon the 
consent of the governed, and if the government it to remain one of limited powers, individual justices must 
refrain from participating in political disputes and avoid creating new policy.  But if the justices are to be 
expected to stay within the parameters of law, the people must ensure that those parameters reflect their 
standards and protect their rights in a satisfactory matter.  They must encourage Congress to draft clear 
legislation and not avoid controversial issues.  They must exercise their rational faculties and use their vote as 
a tool to influence government, instead of ceremoniously casting it as a token acknowledgment of their 
servitude to the ideas of others.  In short, there must be an end to inaction in the political realm.  If this were 
to be accomplished, the judiciary would be free to uphold the language and intent of the laws and the 
Constitution without scruple, for it would represent the will of the people. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
134Many argue that the amendment process is impossible, that Congress is too unresponsive, the citizenry too 
uneducated and apathetic, that lobbyists control national politics, etc.  While such objections are founded upon a 
legitimate and lamentable state of affairs, the fact remains that the amendment process has not been abolished and 
remains a viable, if difficult option.  The polls remain open to all citizens, and voting rights have been extended to the 
greatest extent in all of American history, and yet the majority of citizens take no action to educate themselves, promote 
causes, or cast their ballots.  If they were to do so, their government would most certainly respond. 
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